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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyses the Euro Area in light of the Theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas (OCA), aiming to draw some conclusions about whether the Euro Area 
is currently closer or farther from the concept of an OCA than it was before the recent 
shocks it has endured, namely, the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2010 sovereign 
debt crisis. We use a descriptive analysis of five criteria suggested by the OCA theory, 
during two distinct periods: 1999-2007 and 2008-2016. While we find some countries’ 
experiences to stand out, our findings appear to indicate an overall convergence of the 
Euro Area in the second period. Thus, after having experienced two consecutive crises, 
overall, the Euro Area does not appear to be farther from an OCA, with some indicators 
suggesting a tendency for it to become closer. 
 
JEL-codes: E32, F15, F33, F45  
Key-words: Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), Euro Crisis, Sovereign Debt Crisis 
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Resumo 
 
Esta dissertação analisa a Área do Euro à luz da Teoria das Zonas Monetárias 
Ótimas (ZMO), tentando retirar algumas conclusões face ao seu atual posicionamento 
enquanto ZMO, tendo em conta a recente sucessão de crises, nomeadamente, a crise 
financeira global de 2008 e a crise de dívida soberana de 2010. Para isso realizou-se uma 
análise descritiva de 5 critérios sugeridos pela teoria, a ser aplicada a dois períodos 
distintos: 1999-2007 e 2008-2016. Apesar do destaque de alguns países, os resultados 
parecem indicar, no geral, uma convergência no segundo período. Deste modo, mesmo 
após a recente sucessão de crises, a Área do Euro não aparenta estar mais distante do 
conceito de ZMO, com alguns indicadores sugerindo uma possível aproximação. 
 
Códigos-JEL: E32, F15, F33, F45 
Palavras-chave: Zonas Monetárias Ótimas, Crise da Zona Euro, Crise da Dívida 
Soberana, União Económica e Monetária Europeia 
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Introduction 
 
Bearing in mind the recent shocks that hit the Euro Area, namely the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, this dissertation makes an empirical 
assessment of the Euro Area in light of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), 
aiming to draw some conclusions about whether the Euro Area is currently closer or 
farther from the concept of an OCA. 
The European Union (EU) has been through some metamorphoses since the 
beginning. With the creation of the Single European Market, a monetary union seemed 
like the next step to take and in 1999 the Euro Area was created. Although having a brief 
history as a monetary union, especially when comparing with the United States (US), the 
Euro Area has already been put to the test. The recent succession of crises, which started 
in 2007 with the subprime crisis in the United States, made bare fragilities and 
asymmetries among countries comprising the Euro Area and made the Theory of OCA a 
much discussed topic among academics, especially when we keep in mind that economic 
turbulence can impact the main OCA criteria (e.g., the evolution of business cycles or 
trade patterns). The policy responses taken are also very important, especially when one 
considers that the monetary policy cannot be used individually to respond to those shocks.  
Therefore, in this context, it is relevant to analyse the experience of the Euro Area, 
in light of the OCA theory, in order to assess how well the European Economic and  
Monetary Union (EMU) fairs regarding these criteria. Moreover, the rise of some 
elements of Euroscepticism and whether they can or cannot be justified, reinforces this 
need to investigate whether the Euro Area is closer or farther from the concept of an OCA. 
We also extend our analysis to the other EU members, allowing for comparisons with 
Euro Area members and to consider the possibility of Euro Area enlargements. 
Accordingly, the main objectives of this dissertation are: 1) to analyse the Euro 
Area regarding multiple OCA criteria; 2) to extend this analysis to the other EU members; 
3) to compare the performance of Euro Area members and non-members in light of those 
criteria; 4) to make these analyses for two distinct sub-periods, considering the recent 
crises experience. 
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Regarding time periods, we analyse two periods: pre and post 2008. Hence, our 
first period comprises 1999 through 2007 and our second period comprises 2008-2016. 
We chose these two periods in order to analyse the performance since the launch of the 
Euro Area until the global crisis and also to confine the effects of both crises to only one 
period. The second period is marked not only by the 2008 global financial crisis, but also 
by the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. 
Concerning methodology, we will use a descriptive analysis. This methodology 
has been used by several empirical studies aiming to assess monetary unions using the 
OCA framework (e.g., Loureiro et al., 2012 and Quah, 2016). We will analyse the Euro 
Area experience, in light of the OCA theory, using 5 indicators: inflation differentials, 
trade integration, export diversification, business cycles synchronisation and labour 
mobility. 
As it was already pointed out, the OCA theory is a much discussed topic, and by 
applying it to the Euro Area and see how it fares one can take away important lessons for 
the conduct of economic policy. The main contribution of this dissertation will be of an 
empirical nature, by assessing whether the Euro Area has become closer or farther from 
the concept of an OCA, during the length of its existence. Our empirical analysis has the 
particularity of being implemented for two different time periods, with one of them being 
more economically turbulent than the other. We also contribute with the study of the 
remaining EU members, in order to compare this group’s performance with the Euro Area, 
and analyse whether they are closer to a possible accession. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to use this methodology for these time periods and sample countries, 
in order to analyse the Euro Area stance as an OCA. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 1) we briefly review the 
literature on OCA theory. In chapter 2) we analyse the experience of different monetary 
unions. In chapter 3) we briefly review frequently used methodologies and discuss the 
one we will be using. In chapter 4) we assess the Euro Area as an OCA and the possible 
accession of the remaining EU members. We finish with some concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 1. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
 
In this chapter we will briefly review the literature on the OCA theory.1 In section 
1.1) we analyse key OCA criteria and in section 1.2) we analyse the “endogeneity 
hypothesis”. A key concept of this dissertation is the notion of optimum currency area. 
Mundell (1961) was the pioneer of the theory (Fleming, 1971). Mongelli (2008, p.2) has 
provided the following definition: “An optimum currency area (OCA) can be defined as 
the optimal geographical area for a single currency, or for several currencies, whose 
exchange rates are irrevocably pegged. The single currency, or the pegged currencies, 
fluctuate jointly vis-à-vis other currencies.” 
 
1.1 The Traditional Approach and the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
As mentioned before, Mundell (1961) was the pioneer of the OCA theory 
(Fleming, 1971). Mundell (1961) proposed that there could be a lot of potential for certain 
regions to come together and form a currency area whereby the different exchange rates 
are pegged. This contribution aimed at defining the optimum domain of that area. When 
one has a flexible exchange rate, one can use it to correct balance of payments 
disequilibria, by devaluing the currency. However, when a country has a fixed exchange 
rate regime, it loses the exchange rate policy as an adjustment instrument.  
There is another way to correct these disequilibria, which is by having price 
flexibility and labour mobility. Mundell (1961) presents a model to elaborate this view.  
Consider two countries, A and B, both with full employment and balance of payments 
equilibrium in their initial state. In the short run there is price and wage rigidity. Consider 
also that, in this first scenario, each entity has its own currency and the monetary authority 
aims to prevent inflation. First, imagine that country B suffers a demand shock, with the 
                                                      
1For surveys of this literature, please see Ishyama (1975), Mongelli (2005 and 2008), De Grauwe (2012) 
and Masini (2014). 
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consumers in B redirecting their demand towards products produced by country A. This 
will cause inflationary pressures in A and the rise of unemployment and reduction of 
output in B. These effects will be more or less prominent in each of the entities depending 
on A's willingness to help B support the burden of adjustment. Given the monetary 
authorities' concern with inflation, A will not let the price level rise. Hence, if A will not 
let prices rise and if B cannot lower them, the adjustment will be made through the 
reduction of employment and output in country B.  
Consider now, a second scenario, in which both countries share a currency and a 
central bank, whose objective now is full employment. Imagine again that country B 
suffers a demand shock which causes the demand to shift towards A-produced goods. 
The same effects are in order, country A suffers inflationary pressures and country B is 
faced with a rise in unemployment. The central bank will try to minimize unemployment 
with an expansionary monetary policy, but this will happen at the expense of inflation in 
country A.  
Mundell (1961) concludes that, when the region one is considering has multiple 
currencies, unemployment in deficit countries is dependent on the willingness of surplus 
countries to help with easing the adjustment, by allowing inflation to prevail. On the other 
hand, when the region shares a currency, inflation will depend on the level of 
unemployment that the central bank is willing to accept. 
The existence of more than one currency area implies that those areas should be 
linked through a system of flexible exchange rates (Mundell, 1961). However, if one 
region of production is extended to more than one currency area, and that region suffers 
an asymmetric shock, the movement of flexible exchange rates will do little to correct the 
disequilibria. Nevertheless, if national currencies were to be abandoned in favour of 
regional currencies, the actions of the flexible exchange rates could correct possible 
balance of payments disequilibria, thus assuring price stability and employment.  
To define the optimum region, Mundell (1961) took into consideration the 
Ricardian principle about factor mobility. If there is high internal factor mobility and low 
international factor mobility, then a system of flexible exchange rates between regions 
will work properly. Given this conclusion, this study states that for this rearrangement of 
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currencies to happen, political change is also needed, which at the time seemed possible 
in the ex-colonies and Western Europe.  
Mundell (1961) also argues that, keeping in mind only the argument of stability, 
the larger the number of currency areas the better; yet when one looks at the costs, having 
too many currencies might cause money to lose its utility and one would arrive at a 
situation no better than barter. 
Kenen (1969) criticizes Mundell’s (1961) criterion arguing that migration might 
have some flaws, especially if there are different labour intensities in both regions. 
Moreover, one cannot really be sure if migration can restore a perfect balance in both 
regions, even if it has resolved unemployment issues. Labour has to have similar skills to 
move between the two regions, which leads to the conclusion that the optimum currency 
area needs to be small. Ishiyama (1975) also points out that beyond the real costs 
associated with migration, there are also psychological costs associated with the 
adjustment to a different environment and culture. Ishiyama (1975) also criticises 
Mundell’s (1961) lack of distinction between capital mobility and labour mobility. 
The seminal papers of McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) have also made 
important contributions. While McKinnon (1963) suggests openness of the economy as 
another criterion, Kenen (1969) focuses on the diversification of production.  
McKinnon (1963) tries to develop even more the concept of optimality, 
considering the influence of an economy's trade openness. In order to do so, McKinnon 
(1963) relies on the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods, where tradable goods refer to 
those which can be traded outside the home country and non-tradable goods refer to those 
which cannot, because it is not feasible to transport them.  
To further explore the role of the openness of the economy as criterion for the 
OCA theory, McKinnon (1963) uses a model to assess what is the best way to assure 
external balance, either by external exchange rate flexibility or by the use of internal fiscal 
or monetary policies. It is important to point out that the area under analysis does not have 
the ability to affect external prices. If an economy has a large tradable goods sector, it is 
better off if it uses fiscal policy to assure external stability and to shield itself from 
speculative movements. As an economy becomes increasingly open, flexible exchange 
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rates become less effective in assuring external stability and can even cause problems to 
internal price level stability. However, when an economy has a large non-tradable sector, 
fiscal/monetary policy may not be successful as an external stability mechanism because 
it will cause more unemployment in that sector. If there is mobility rigidity between both 
sectors the adjustment will be slower.  
For Kenen (1969), defining an optimum currency area by perfect labour mobility 
is not the best approach. Instead, Kenen (1969) advocates that a diversified production 
structure is more relevant. A well-diversified economy can export a wider range of 
products, and even though they are still susceptible to shocks, those will even out 
eventually, which makes it a more stable economy when compared to those with less 
diversification. This also means that a diversified economy will not need to change its 
terms of trade as often. Regarding employment, when the diversified economy faces a 
demand shock, unemployment will not rise as sharply. Regarding investment, capital 
formation will not have huge variations. If there is a need to invest in one exporting 
product that does not necessarily mean that investment will decrease in other exporting 
products.  
Kenen (1969) also suggests that fiscal and monetary policies should be applied to 
the same domain, which would mean that the whole currency area would be under the 
same, cohesive fiscal domain. The currency area would need to be comprised of multiple 
single-product regions, but with an efficient fiscal system which contributed to internal 
stability. Kenen (1969) acknowledges fixed exchange rates to be better for well 
diversified-economies as long as they possess the necessary internal policies to deal with 
the unemployment that might rise due to exports fluctuations and imperfect mobility of 
labour. 
As discussed above, each of these authors suggested the criterion they 
acknowledged as the best in defining an optimum currency area, having each one of them 
to be applied singularly. This is one of the reasons why the traditionalist view on the 
theory is criticized, because of the need to choose only one criterion to define the optimum 
currency area (Fleming, 1971; Ishiyama, 1975).  
Fleming (1971) was the first to suggest a cost-benefit analysis for the decision to 
join or to form an area with fixed exchange rates or a common currency. To the criteria 
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suggested by the previous three authors, Fleming (1971) drew attention to the role of 
money illusion in wage determination, the degree of economic policy integration, and 
moreover, the similarity of rates of inflation.  
This last criterion holds great importance because the more similar the rates of 
inflation of countries aiming to participate in a fixed exchange rate area, there is less need 
for them to sacrifice their preferred points in the Phillips curve. However, there will 
always be some negative implications for the unemployment-inflation relationship, even 
if it does not necessarily mean the deterioration of both (Fleming, 1971). Ishiyama (1975) 
supports this criterion since it shifts attention towards macroeconomic phenomena and 
considers that its significance depends on the role played both by rates of inflation and 
productivity growth on payments disequilibria. Fleming (1971) also refers to the need for 
fiscal transfers between participants to be made easier.  
Like Fleming (1971), Ishiyama (1975) also criticises the single criterion approach, 
acknowledging the cost-benefit analysis as better and superior, since it compares the 
negative and positive effects of creating a fixed exchange rate area. Nonetheless, 
Ishiyama (1975) recognizes the difficulty in such endeavour, especially if there are 
interdependencies between them. The benefits of having a common currency are the 
elimination of conversion costs, the reduction and eventual elimination of speculative 
capital flows and, as suggested by Mundell (1973), savings on exchange reserves. 
Regarding costs, Ishiyama (1975) acknowledges the loss of monetary policy autonomy, 
the effects on the unemployment-inflation relationship and possible worsening of 
economic conditions for certain unprepared regions. Mundell (1973) listed additional 
benefits of a common currency such as the need to hold fewer reserves, the sharing of 
shocks, either positive or negative, the sharing of risk fluctuations and the ability to 
distribute them through time, thus easing the burden. 
 
1.2 The Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria 
 
Mélitz (1995) criticised the lack of progress that had been made since Mundell 
(1961). Mélitz (1995) urged the creation of a unifying framework that could address the 
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theory and policy aspects. In the following years, a new advancement in the theory was 
about to be made. The literature on this topic started to shift its focus to “meta-properties” 
and the possibility of an “endogeneity of OCA”. The credit for this breakthrough goes to 
Frankel and Rose (1998) (De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005).  
Frankel and Rose (1998) studied the correlation of intensity of trade among 
countries with the synchronisation of business cycles and found that there is a positive 
and strong relation between the two, which would mean that even if a country is not 
suitable for entering a currency union, it might reveal positive effects after entrance. As 
Frankel and Rose (1998) have said, “(...) a country is more likely to satisfy the criteria for 
entry into a currency union ex-post than ex-ante” (p. 1024).  
Alesina et. al (2002) agreed, considering that the application of the theory prior to 
joining a currency area might underestimate potential benefits. Likewise, De Grauwe and 
Mongelli (2005) also examine the endogenous effects of participation in a common 
currency in four areas, namely, economic integration, financial integration, symmetry of 
shocks and product and labour market flexibility.  
All of these authors mentioned above were of the same opinion that the creation 
of a common currency in Europe would be able to reap the benefits of endogeneity, since 
“(...) the euro area may turn into an optimum currency area (OCA) after the launch of the 
monetary integration even if it wasn’t an OCA before (...)” (De Grauwe and Mongelli 
2005, p. 7). 
Krugman (1993), however, argued that Europe may experience regional 
specialisation similar to what happened in the US. There are US regions which are very 
specialised and, therefore, more susceptible to asymmetric shocks. Not having access to 
exchange rate policy, or regional-level monetary policy, those regions would have to 
resort to fiscal policy, or rely on emigration to lower unemployment. This work also 
argues that the fostering of economic integration would lead to increased regional 
specialisation, making regional exports more susceptible to shocks. The cost of such 
shocks would be even greater without a mechanism similar to the US-style fiscal 
federalism. 
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Chapter 2. Currency Areas in Practice 
 
2.1 The European Economic and Monetary Union 
 
2.1.1 The Road to the Euro 
When a few European countries decided to form a community to help them 
prosper and grow together, they could not possibly have in mind all that would happen in 
the following decades. The Community kept on growing and to strengthen their 
relationship, especially after the creation of the Single European Market, a plan for an 
European currency started to be drawn. The road to the Euro was a long one that started 
several years prior to the actual circulation of the currency itself. Commissions were held, 
which provided reports that shed some guidance and eventually led to the Maastricht 
Treaty (Mongelli, 2008). One of the most relevant, at least regarding the theory, was the 
“One Market, One Money” report by Emerson et al. (1990). Although it considered the 
OCA theory as being unable to provide a satisfactory framework for analysing the 
creation of the EMU, it was able to spark a revived interest in the theory and new literature 
started to emerge (Mongelli, 2008).  
Emerson et al. (1990) illustrated the benefits and the costs of a common European 
currency. The EMU would contribute to foster microeconomic efficiency, because a 
common currency complements the single market; foster macroeconomic stability, with 
less fluctuation in output and unemployment; and raise fairness among participating 
members. The benefits acknowledged were efficiency gains with the elimination of 
exchange rate uncertainty as well as transaction costs; price stability resulting from a 
reputational gain of low inflation; ameliorate public finances by granting autonomy to 
respond to country-specific shocks, rules to avoid excessive deficits and policy-mix 
coordination; savings in external reserves and even possibly some seigniorage gains. The 
main costs identified were the loss of the exchange rate adjustment instrument and the 
loss of monetary independence. However, Emerson et al. (1990) acknowledged the EMU 
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would reduce country-specific shocks and that fiscal policy, at both national and 
community levels, would also help with shock absorption.  
Ever since the possibility of forming a currency union in Europe was considered 
that there have been numerous studies assessing it. The OCA theory was rendered 
outdated and incapable of offering a framework to assess the European endeavour 
(Emerson et al., 1990). The convergence criteria were nominal and the possibility of 
endogeneity started to be explored as a justification for continuing the project (Wagner, 
2014).  
Nevertheless, other studies, advised caution in undertaking such a daring project. 
Among the most prominent we find Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). This work 
developed an “OCA index” to measure how the European countries would fair with a 
common currency. The countries were divided into three groups: those that were ready to 
form a currency area, those that were converging and those that had shown little 
convergence. France did not enter the first group, which led the authors to conclude that 
the French desire of participating in a common currency was motivated by politics. In 
another work, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) noted that the EU suffered more 
asymmetric shocks than the US and that they were slower to adjust. This meant that the 
EU might have a harder time in operating a currency area.  
Bayoumi and Prasad (1997) investigated the causes of shocks to output and the 
role of the labour market as an adjustment mechanism in the US and the EU. The 
importance of different types of shocks seemed to be similar for both economic regions. 
However, looking at the sectorial level, the authors found that in the US, disturbances 
seemed to occur more in the non-traded goods sector, whilst the EU seemed to be more 
affected by disturbances in the traded goods sector. Nevertheless, the impact of those 
disturbances in the EU had apparently been diminishing since the 1980s, which might be 
explained by the European desire for further integration (Bayoumi and Prasad, 1997). 
This study also found that, when it comes to labour markets as adjustment mechanisms, 
these two economic areas displayed some differences. The US labour market was more 
integrated than Europe’s which made it a more reliable adjustment mechanism (the 
authors also noted that part of this could also be explained due to the existence of a single 
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currency in the US). According to the authors, if this low labour mobility situation persists 
after EMU, Europe might have to deal with large wage differentials. 
Gros (1996) also studied labour mobility as an adjustment mechanism to shocks 
in the EU. More precisely, this study analysed how shocks to exports affected 
unemployment in the past and concluded that they have not been determinant. Therefore, 
if one were to expect shocks to exports to have some impact on unemployment in the 
future, these would have to be larger than before. Moreover, the author also argues that 
the degree of labour mobility is not as important as may have been previously thought, 
since what was important was the difference between labour mobility between countries 
comprising the currency area, and labour mobility between these and other countries. In 
other words, labour has to be more mobile within the region than between the region and 
the rest of the world. Therefore, labour mobility can act as an adjustment mechanism so 
long as migrants do not show preference for the country they decide to move to, as long 
as it is a member of the currency area. One of the reforms that could help foster labour 
mobility is making the housing market more flexible (Gros 1996).   
 
2.1.2 Early Years and Early Experience 
Even if the OCA theory would advise caution, the European monetary project 
continued to take its steps because, according to Krugman (2012), European leaders’ “(...) 
had their hearts set on a single currency” (Krugman 2012, p. 443). On the 1st of January 
of 1999 the EMU was created with irrevocably fix exchange rates of 11 countries and the 
Euro was introduced in circulation 3 years later.  
Kempa (2002) analysed the convergence process of the EMU, before the actual 
introduction of the Euro, and found that countries were indeed on a convergence path, 
which may continue. Danthine et al. (2001) analysed the impact of the single currency 
just one year after its introduction. In the two years prior to the introduction of the Euro, 
the European financial market had suffered a huge transformation, which could be 
explained by the direct effects of the Euro, and one year after the introduction, indirect 
effects were being felt. Still, according to the authors, that does not mean that the efforts 
to promote a more homogeneous market should cease. Beine et al. (2003) studied the 
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behaviour of business cycles and identified three groups: 1) countries with synchronized 
cycles (Germany, Italy, Finland, Portugal, The Netherlands); 2) an intermediate group, to 
which France and Spain belong, and finally, 3) a more peripheral group with countries 
such as the UK, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. According to the authors, the EMU, 
as it was, could exist fairly well.  
Lane (2006) analysed how the EMU affected the economies of its members, 
regarding inflation and economic integration. In the run-up to the EMU, there was a 
significant reduction in inflation differentials during 1992-1998, but after the start of the 
third stage of the EMU, and during its first years, there was dispersion of inflation rates 
among its members. According to this work, member countries also exhibited very 
different economic fundamentals and showed differences in structural policies for the 
labour and product markets. Since national fiscal policies constituted the current 
adjustment mechanisms of national governments within the currency union, and since 
during the run-up to the EMU, in order to fulfil the convergence criteria, national fiscal 
positions had improved, the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced to ensure that those 
criteria would still be observed after accession into the EMU (Lane, 2006). 
According to Hein and Truger (2005), in a monetary union real wage 
determination can act as an adjustment mechanism to shocks – this is why structural 
reforms of the European labour market were argued to be needed, to help with 
deregulation, decentralization of wage bargaining, to foster labour mobility and help ease 
the problem of unemployment. This study found that there needs to be an effective 
coordination of wage bargaining, otherwise this may lead to regional disparities. 
Moreover, the lack of moderation in nominal wage will make small countries suffer losses 
in unemployment and, in bigger countries, given their influence on the overall area 
inflation, will force the European Central Bank (ECB) to act, which can result in losses 
for the union as a whole, in terms of employment and output. Likewise, Issing (2000) 
acknowledges that national wages need to be set according to national productivities and 
market conditions, especially because labour mobility has a lesser role as an adjustment 
mechanism in Europe than when compared with the US. Another question posed by 
Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) is the flexibility of wages, which seemed to be low due to 
interdependencies, especially during the integration process. According to the authors, 
smaller countries have experienced wage growth disconnected from productivity growth, 
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which will take time to correct and may even result in loss of competitiveness, making 
the whole process of adjustment even more costly.  
Alesina et al. (2008) noted that European labour markets seemed to be made of 
two facets: on the one hand, there are labour unions which protect their workers and, on 
the other hand, there are temporary job contracts which offer very little job security. In 
the short run, this seems to have helped raise employment. However, in the medium to 
long run, that might be unsustainable, given that these two facets may fail to co-exist. 
This study argues that the temporary workers might force deregulation on the union 
labour workers, which in turn would help with labour market reforms, or the temporary 
workers may themselves demand more protection.  
 
2.1.3 The “Euro Effect” on Trade 
One of the most discussed benefits, presented by Emerson et al. (1990), was that 
the single currency would have a positive impact on trade, contributing to its increase 
among members, because there would be fewer transaction costs and lesser trading risks 
between countries. Naturally, the size of this “Euro effect on trade” was a topic that soon 
gained momentum, especially, when one has in mind the study by Rose (2000) and its 
striking results. Rose (2000) analysed the effects of a common currency on trade and 
found that trade between members which share a currency can increase up to three times 
as much. 
Bun and Klaassen (2002) estimated this “Euro effect” on trade. According to this 
study, the effect can manifest itself through the real exchange rate volatility channel, as 
well as through other channels, namely, the credibility of the nominal exchange fix, the 
reduction of transaction costs and market integration. The authors estimated a cumulative 
increase of trade between members of 3.9% in 1999, 6.9% in 2000 and 9.6% in 2001; and 
in the long-run, they expect an effect of around 37.8%.  
Micco et al. (2003) also estimated the currency union effect on trade for EMU and 
found the Euro to have had a positive effect on trade. According to this study, the EMU 
has increased trade within the currency area but also with non-EMU countries. The trade 
increase between members seems to have been from 4% to 10%, whilst the trade increase 
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between non-EMU members seems to have been from 8% to 16%. The authors, thus, 
concluded that the Euro has had a significant impact on trade, not only influencing trade 
between members, but also between the currency area and the rest of the world, while at 
the same time showing, remarkably, no evidence of trade diversion.  
De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003) also estimated the Euro impact on trade and made 
the effect as independent as possible from other effects that could also influence trade, 
for example, cultural factors or countries’ proximity. The authors found that trade had 
increased between 2.6% and 6.3% and, albeit small, they acknowledge that this was due 
to the reinforcement of trade links that had been occurring prior to the introduction of the 
Euro itself. Moreover, their results are focused on the short-run, and even though the 
authors are open to the possibility that the Euro effect on trade may increase in the long-
run, they see such possibility as being unlikely. 
More recently, Kunroo et al. (2016) examined the Euro adoption effects on trade 
in the EMU, from 1994 to 2011. When using a two-way fixed effects model, the authors 
found that if the two countries trading use the same currency, bilateral trade increases by 
up to 14.57%, but when they stop controlling for the time effects, the effect on trade 
decreases and amounts to only 11.85%. Nonetheless, these effects are higher than when 
only one of the countries belongs to the Euro Area.  
 
2.1.4 The Possibility of Enlargement 
Both the EU and the Euro Area would obviously be open to the possibility of 
admitting members in the future, especially with results proving a positive effect on trade. 
Naturally, new accession countries to the EU would be interested to know if they would, 
as well, be reaping the benefits of the single currency. This is also a pertinent question 
given that “All EU Member States, except Denmark and the United Kingdom, are 
required to adopt the Euro and join the Euro Area.”2 
                                                      
2 From https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-
and-when_en accessed July 2017 
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Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) analysed the correlation of demand and supply 
shocks between the Euro Area and the accession countries in the 1990s. The authors 
identified 3 groups, based on GDP and inflation correlation: 1) low similarity of GDP and 
inflation (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, smaller OECD countries 
and Croatia); 2) similarity of GDP, but not of inflation (Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Finland and the Netherlands); 3) similarity of GDP and inflation (EU 
countries, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia). This study also found that supply shocks 
between Euro Area and accession countries seemed to be more correlated than demand 
shocks and that there are even some accession countries exhibiting very highly correlated 
shocks with the Euro Area - some show correlations comparable to the member countries 
themselves. The countries that seem to have the highest correlation of supply shocks are 
Hungary and Estonia, with Hungary also being the country with the highest correlation 
of demand shocks. 
Regarding size of shocks, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) also notice that it does 
not seem to be typically related to the size of the economy and are usually low for all 
accession countries, excluding Poland and Slovenia. Furthermore, Czech Republic and 
Estonia seem to have experienced lower shocks than those felt in the core of the Euro 
Area. Considering this, the authors conclude there may be an easy adoption of the Euro, 
which would encourage countries to proceed with structural reforms. 
Frenkel and Nickel (2002) studied the correlation of supply and demand shocks 
between the Euro Area countries and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), 
to analyse if the latter countries can cope with the lack of monetary autonomy and 
exchange rates as an adjustment instrument. The rationale is that the more correlated and 
the faster are CEECs to recover, the better they will deal with this loss of instruments and 
successfully be part of the Euro Area. This study found that there are still differences in 
the types of shocks and on the rate of adjustment between these groups of countries. Even 
when the author compare the CEECs with the bigger economies of the Euro Area, namely 
Germany, France and Italy, their conclusion remains the same. However, when 
comparing individual countries, they found that the more advanced CEECs display 
correlations similar to those that the smaller EMU members have with the bigger EMU 
participants. The correlation is also likely to increase after their accession into EMU. 
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Frenkel and Nickel (2002) concluded that the more advanced CEECs will not have higher 
costs, as previously thought, if they join Euro Area. 
 
2.1.5 Design and Structural Flaws 
Despite the positive results mentioned so far, and even at the prospect of 
enlargement of both the EU and the Euro Area, some authors identified some design and 
structural flaws of the single currency area and, at that, some that might compromise these 
countries’ ability to recover from a devastating economic recession if they were left 
unattended and uncorrected. 
Lane (2006) points out some sources of asymmetrical shocks. The author regards 
entry into Euro Area as a form of asymmetrical shock, since it affected more the 
peripheral countries, in a structural way, and caused lending and housing booms in the 
periphery, contributing to enlarging the inflation differentials. Moreover, the Euro Area 
can amplify asymmetric shocks, especially because, with the existence of a common 
nominal interest rate, given inflation differentials, this translates into different real interest 
rates and different dissemination of investment through the whole Euro Area. This study 
also acknowledges that the common Euro exchange rate can result in asymmetric shocks 
between members depending on their trade patterns – countries which trade mainly with 
members of the union are sheltered from exchange rate variations, which is not the case 
for countries which trade with outsiders.  
Hein and Truger (2005) acknowledged that the lack of an efficient mechanism of 
“fiscal federalism” and the restrains on both fiscal and monetary policies will make 
stabilization more difficult in a recession. In turn, Hein and Truger (2005) suggest that 
the inflation target should increase and that fiscal policies should be able to let automatic 
stabilizers function properly. A coordination of policies is also needed to prevent free-
riding.  
Matthes (2009) acknowledged some flaws, especially in southern European 
countries, that might affect their abilities to deal with asymmetric shocks, namely labour 
market rigidities and higher inflation. Likewise, Zemanek (2010) argues that there have 
also been structural problems among Euro Area members since the introduction of the 
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single currency, namely regarding price inflation and wage differentials. The channelling 
of savings from the core of EMU to the periphery countries also contributed to the rise of 
inflation in the southern countries, leading to credit booms and asset-price bubbles – this 
“private insurance channel” dubbed as a proxy for the inexistent fiscal transfer 
mechanism, might not hold in crisis times (Pasimeni 2014).  
Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) studied how the EMU has influenced the way 
political shocks affect economies. Political shocks are being less influential in national 
markets, affecting smaller economies in particular –  this, along with the convergence of 
policies and economic structures, are two benefits provided by membership in the EMU. 
However, there is a cost. According to the authors, financial markets will see their 
disciplinary role for keeping governments in check lessen, which may make politicians 
have fewer incentives to pursue reforms. Likewise, Wagner (2014) acknowledged the 
asymmetric incentives for structural reforms. When a country wants to enter the EMU, it 
will do everything it can to enter, including costly structural reforms. However, once it 
gains membership, the incentives to reform decline, because the country sees it has being 
less likely to be thrown out, because a members’ exit will be costly for both parties. Since 
leaving the Euro Area will have significant costs, the decision to join should be viewed 
as irreversible (Lane, 2006).  
 
2.1.6 Recent Crises and Asymmetrical Effects 
Unfortunately, the Euro Area and the EU would be hit by back-to-back crises that 
would expose those fragilities and design flaws. The subprime crisis, originated in the US 
in 2007, resulted in a global crisis that also hit the Euro Area, and the rest of Europe. 
While some countries were starting to recover, others, mainly in southern Europe, were 
still dealing with the adjustment when they were hit yet again by a new crisis in 2010, 
when a sovereign debt crisis ensued and raised questions of countries’ solvency.  
Pasimeni (2014) concluded that the “private insurance channel” had played its 
part in the rise of debt on southern countries and the exposure to it by banks in the core 
countries, resulted in a fragile banking system. This study also pointed out that the lack 
of a common fiscal policy was one of the flaws in EMU’s architecture and claimed that 
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the common budget was not efficient as a mechanism to absorb shocks. As a suggestion 
to help with the lack of a transfer mechanism, the author computed a common budget that 
could be independent from Euro Area’s growth strategy and found that the main 
contributor would be Germany and The Netherlands, with the main beneficiary being 
France. Pasimeni (2014) also acknowledges that, given the current economic situation, 
such endeavour would be quite difficult to achieve. Zemanek (2010), however, adverts 
that even though some southern European countries experienced low levels of 
competitiveness and are suffering from current accounts deficits, a transfer union is not 
the way to solve the problem. In fact, this author acknowledges that it can even contribute 
to exacerbate the problems because countries know that, when facing troublesome times 
and in need of financial assistance, that would be provided by the other members, giving 
them no incentives to respect the limits on debt. 
Notwithstanding, Europe tried to promote some reforms to help overcome recent 
difficulties and the ECB proceeded with unconventional policies that some feared would 
violate its monetary mandate to help countries which were in need (Jager and Hafner 
2013). Jager and Hafner (2013) considered those reforms to not only help with the 
adjustment to the crisis but also in helping the future performance of the Euro Area as a 
currency area. Krugman (2012) pointed out that the theory of OCA had been underrated 
in the conception of EMU. The author also argued that the lack of fiscal integration among 
countries and the incapability of the ECB to act efficiently as a lender of last resort only 
contributed to the worsening of the overall economic environment. Krugman (2012) 
suggested that the ECB should reinforce its role as “lender of last resort” even at the 
possibility of moral hazard, because without a readily available option of liquidity, 
member countries in need may fall pray of self-fulfilling prophecies. Hence, according to 
the author, further integration seems to be necessary to make the Euro workable.  
Backing of banks on a European level is also necessary, through deposit 
insurance, injection of capital into governments instead of loans, and rescue programmes 
at a European level when needed (not unlike the Trouble Asset Relief Program TARP of 
the US) – these were some of the measures proposed by Krugman (2012). The author also 
suggests that the inflation target should increase, in order to help the more peripheral 
European countries regain competitiveness and not be so penalised by the burden of 
adjustment. Degiannakis et al. (2016) advise that institutional constraints to fiscal policy 
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should not choke its ability to act when it is necessary, but when fiscal limits are breached, 
other forms of stabilisation mechanisms should come into play, such as a ‘union-wide 
borrowing facility’ or other forms of fiscal transfer systems. 
 
2.1.7 Euro Area Convergence 
Prior to the introduction of the Euro, the hypothesis of an “endogeneity of OCA” 
started to emerge and somewhat justified early admission of countries which did not quite 
achieved a significant level of real convergence. Hence, naturally, some years further 
along the European experience, some studies regarding convergence emerged. 
Regarding convergence within the Euro Area, it seems to have been a lot faster in 
the decade preceding the Euro adoption (Vieira and Vieira, 2012) and even though it 
strengthened relationships between members, namely increasing trade and business cycle 
synchronisation, the same also appears to have happened between the Euro Area and other 
European countries (Willett et al., 2010). Degiannakis et al. (2016) found that, overall, 
fiscal policy has an important role in determining business cycle synchronization across 
Euro Area members. According to the authors, fiscal policy has a significant impact for 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, but has a smaller effect on other 
countries such as Austria or Belgium. 
There has been an improvement regarding the OCA properties, but that seems to 
be verified only in core countries (Vieira and Vieira, 2012). The necessary degree of real 
convergence seemed to be lacking (Andrade and Duarte, 2015) and there were even 
possible divergences (Wagner, 2014). Some authors blame this on the fewer structural 
reforms undertaken after admission into the Euro Area (Willett et al., 2010 and Wagner, 
2014) and argue that entry should not be an excuse to lessen them (Barbosa and Alves, 
2011). 
Regarding labour, Campolmi and Faia (2011) also found that there are different 
labour market institutions across Europe which can impact, in different ways, inflation, 
real wages and firm costs, when countries are faced with shocks, and may result in welfare 
losses. They also noted more volatility in two situations: if unemployment is less 
protected or if employment is more protected. 
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Labour market mobility is often classified as not being fully satisfied due to 
language and cultural barriers, regulatory constraints and work permits (Pasimeni, 2014; 
Andrade and Duarte, 2015) and even regional attachment (Andrade and Duarte, 2015). 
This seems to translate into a less effective shock absorption mechanism (Jager and 
Hafner, 2013 and Pasimeni, 2014), especially when one compares it with the US case 
(Pasimeni, 2014). Moreover, there seem to be differences in the workforce of northern 
and southern countries, with the north being more technological and innovative whereas 
the south is more reliant on less qualified workers (Andrade e Duarte 2015). Recent crises 
seem to have forced labour mobility with people moving from deficit to surplus countries, 
in search of employment opportunities (Pasimeni, 2014), namely there was increased 
migration from southern European to northern European countries (Chojnicki et al., 
2016). This increase in migration should improve the European labour market ability to 
act as a shock absorption mechanism (Chojnicki et al., 2016).  
 
2.2 Other Regions’ Experiences in Light of the OCA Theory 
 
2.2.1 The United States Experience 
One of the longest currency unions in existence is the United States of America. 
Hence, it is only natural that when Europe decided to pursue such an ambitious endeavour 
it looked at the American experience. It is also natural that comparisons between the two 
economic areas would arise, and so the US became the benchmark to analyse the EMU 
experience (Partridge and Rickman 2005). For example, prior to the establishment of the 
Euro Area, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) found that the US suffered less asymmetric 
shocks and had faster adjustments then EU and Bayoumi and Prasad (1997) found that 
the US had a better integrated labour market. The US has had a rich history regarding its 
currency3. The US monetary union has been around since the adoption of the United 
States Constitution in 1788, which makes it easy to understand why the US is often used 
as example for the benefits of a currency union (Rockoff 2000).  
                                                      
3 For a more detailed study on the US currency history see, for example, Rockoff (2000). 
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However, whether or not it is an optimal currency area is often overlooked 
(Partridge and Rickman 2005). Partridge and Rickman (2005) examine this issue, by 
analysing regional business cycles synchronisation in the US, between 1971-1998. This 
study found evidence of asymmetries in regional business cycles throughout the period. 
In fact, synchronisation appears to have decreased in the late eighties, which is attributed 
to an overall decline in business cycles volatility . 
Beckworth (2010) found that, for 1983-2008, a lot of the states had lower 
correlation with the national business cycles than would be expected, with 24 of them 
showing correlation below 70%. These lesser correlated States tended to suffer more with 
the asymmetrical impact of a monetary policy shock. The author concludes that these 
particular economies may have been better off, in 1983-2008, if they were not part of the 
dollar monetary union. Even if the results show that some states may succeed with 
separate currencies and monetary policies, these results should be approached with 
caution since this analysis only pondered on the potential gains derived from having 
separate currencies. The author acknowledges that there are certainly potential costs that 
were not addressed. The US shies away from being an OCA and the government should 
promote policies that will assure convergence of all states (Beckworth 2010). 
Chupp (2016) tested potential combinations of regional groups and found one 
combination that showed an increase in welfare by comparison with the current situation. 
This is probably not the optimal division but, in turn, helps sustain that the US is not an 
OCA. Redesigning an existing currency area, particularly one of the size of the US, does 
not come without costs, but the welfare increase will be sufficient to surpass those costs 
(Chupp 2016). Although having a long monetary history, Rockoff (2000) acknowledges 
that the US only became close to an optimal currency area after the 1930s, which took at 
least one hundred and fifty years. 
 
2.2.2 The Possibility of Currency Areas in Asia 
Considering the European and the American experiences in sustaining monetary 
unions, there is no doubt that they would inspire the prospect of other monetary unions 
in the rest of the world. There has been a sparked interest in whether there is a possibility 
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for the formation of a monetary union in East Asia. This rising interest may be attributed 
to several factors, namely: 1) the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation have not been able to achieve a desired level of trade liberalization 
(Lee and Azali, 2012), 2) the success of both the US and the Euro Area as currency areas 
(Lee and Azali, 2012) and 3) the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Sato and Zhang, 2006; Hsu, 
2010; Lee and Azali, 2012). 
Sato and Zhang (2006) compare a possible East Asian monetary union with the 
Euro Area experience. Euro Area integration is more institutional, while East Asia 
integration is more market driven, being propelled by firms through the reinforcement of 
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other forms of arrangements. The authors 
studied the co-integration of output and found that there were some country pairings 
which showed common business cycles in the short run and similar long run output co-
movements, namely Singapore with Thailand and with Indonesia; Hong Kong with Korea 
and with China; and finally, Japan with Taiwan. Thus, according to this study, a monetary 
union among each of these pairings could be implemented with few costs. 
Hsu (2010) analysed how East Asia responds to domestic, regional and global 
shocks, in order to identify if there is a common “prevalent shock”. After the Asian crisis 
there seems to have been a sharp decline of asymmetrical shocks in the region, and a rise 
in symmetric global and regional shocks. On the basis of this result only, a common 
currency area could be viable with further economic integration. However, when 
comparing with the Euro Area, regional shocks have become more important and 
domestic shocks showed reductions for the majority of countries. This study 
acknowledges that there has been a change in the ‘prevalent shock’ from domestic to 
regional or global. The author is aware that the findings are not enough to provide strong 
support for a common currency area but that it is feasible in the future if countries 
continue to strengthen their economic relations and interdependences. 
Lee and Azali (2012) also analyse the impact of domestic, regional and global 
shocks in East Asia, using the US and Europe as a benchmark. According to this study, 
there was a reduction in country-specific shocks for the majority of the East Asian 
economies. These economies also seem to be less affected by global shocks when 
compared to the European and North-American economies, which might explain why 
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they were not as affected as the US and Europe by the recent global financial crisis. Lee 
and Azali (2012) also found that the importance of regional shocks has increased and this 
is prossibly explained by the fostering of financial integration and trade linkages. East 
Asia is becoming more and more prepared for a monetary union. 
Shafighi and Gharlighi (2016) also explore shocks in East Asia. This study found 
that external supply shocks and external monetary shocks seemed to have a quicker 
transmission across the region which would mean that a monetary area could exist with 
few issues. Demand shocks also seem to be significant for most countries. According to 
the authors, a currency area in East Asia has become more feasible, especially when one 
keeps in mind that adjustment to shocks seems to have become faster when compared 
with previous studies. However, the authors are aware that their findings do not lend 
strong support for a currency area in the region and advise that a smaller union might 
yield better results. 
Quah (2012), using the Euro Area as a benchmark, also tries to evaluate whether 
East Asia is ready for a currency union and which country should serve as the monetary 
anchor: the US, Japan or China. This study uses several indicators to measure key OCA 
criteria, e.g., inflation convergence, business cycle synchronisation and openness to trade. 
Concerning the monetary anchor, the US has a better score than Japan, but Japan seems 
better than China. East Asia countries seem to be as prepared as the founding members 
of the EMU were when they entered the currency area, especially when the monetary 
anchor is the USD (Quah, 2012). 
Dufrénot and Keddad (2014) studied the feasibility of five countries of the 
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a currency area, by analysing 
synchronisation, during different phases of business cycles4. This study found evidence 
of business cycle synchronisation within the region, but also that a sufficient degree of 
synchronisation had not yet been achieved. These countries were not fully prepared to 
enter a monetary union and required further efforts to strengthen their regional economic 
cooperation. To sustain their view, the authors explained that these countries are still 
                                                      
4 Those countries were Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and The Philippines. 
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facing high dependence from external demand, which would mean that they might not be 
able to have a self-sustained growth strategy all by themselves. 
In conclusion, and regarding East Asia, there is evidence to support the viability 
of a monetary union (for example, Hsu, 2010; Quah, 2012 or Lee and Azali, 2012), with 
some countries showing levels of readiness comparable to those of the founding members 
of EMU (Quah 2012). Although, some authors still advise further investigation (Hsu, 
2010 and Shafighi and Garlighi, 2016), and others, smaller monetary unions (Sato and 
Zhang, 2006 and Shafighi and Garlighi, 2016). 
Regmi et al. (2015) analysed South Asian countries, as an OCA, through the study 
of domestic, regional and global shocks, and using the Euro Area as a benchmark. This 
study, which included Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, found these economies to be more affect by country-specific shocks. By 
comparison with the Euro Area, regional shocks still play a lesser role in South Asia. 
According to the authors, South Asian countries are not fit for a common currency 
because domestic shocks seem to be more persistent than regional and global shocks. 
Regmi et al. (2015) suggest that a smaller currency union might yield better results, 
especially if comprised of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. 
 
2.2.3 The African Experience and New Possibilities 
Africa also shows initiatives for the creation of monetary unions. One monetary 
union is comprised by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo, and is known as the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU).5 There are efforts being made to extend this monetary union to the rest of the 
West African economies. The process will be made in two stages. First, the majority of 
the Non-WAEMU members (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) 
will form another monetary union, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ).6 Second, 
                                                      
5For more information on WAEMU, please consult http://www.uemoa.int/en, accessed on July 2017; 
6For more information on WAMZ, please consult http://www.wami-imao.org/, accessed on July 2017; 
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both monetary unions, along with Cape Verde, will come together and form a monetary 
union within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).7 
Houssa (2004) analysed the expansion of the WAEMU monetary union, by 
studying asymmetric demand and supply shocks in West Africa. This study analysed two 
distinct groups of countries, WAEMU (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo) and WAMZ (Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria). The author concluded that 
both groups of countries, overall, show higher correlation of demand shocks than supply 
shocks and, therefore, a monetary union with both groups may be costly. 
Quah (2016), using several indicators under the OCA theory framework, analyses 
WAEMU as a monetary union, and compares its performance to three reference 
countries: the US, China and EMU. Some of these indicators include, for example, 
business cycles synchronisation, inflation convergence and trade integration. According 
to the author, overall, the EMU position as reference country does not seem to be as 
dominant, especially after the global financial crisis. On the other hand, China has been 
gaining importance in several aspects. This study concludes that WAEMU shows low 
levels of compliance with the OCA criteria. 
Loureiro et al. (2012) used the OCA theory to analyse two distinct African 
monetary unions, the WAEMU and the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CAEMC)8, as well as Cape Verde and Comoros. These 16 economies are 
analysed not only in respect to their pegs but, in the case of the monetary unions, 
regarding their feasibility as well. This study also analyses whether the US would be a 
better fitting peg. According to this study, both WAEMU and CAEMC show similar 
levels of trade, with intra-union trade being lower for both, especially when using the 
Euro Area as a benchmark. Both monetary unions also show very different business 
cycles, with WAEMU having a group of countries with relatively similar cycles. The 
majority of these countries have low inflation rates. Aside from Cape Verde, which 
clearly benefits from pegging to the Euro, it is not possible to point out which peg is better 
                                                      
7For more information on ECOWAS, please consult http://www.ecowas.int/, accessed on July 2017; 
8 CAEMC is comprised by Camerron, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon. 
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for each of the remaining countries. Considering these findings, the authors acknowledge 
that both monetary unions shy away from being OCAs. 
Baptista (2015) analysed the formation of the WAMZ, with the participation of 
Cape Verde. This study used three criteria based on the OCA theory: similarity of 
inflation rates, trade integration and business cycles correlation. The author found that if 
the WAMZ was to be created it would not constitute an OCA since there is, overall, low 
similarity of inflation rates, low levels of intra-union trade integration, and the business 
cycles are not very well correlated. Furthermore, if Cape Verde were to decide to join this 
new union, its benefits may not be sufficient to exceed the costs. Assuming that the 
creation of WAMZ would go through, and that political authorities decided that the new 
currency would follow a fixed pair regime, this work tried to determine what currency 
should they peg to, either the Euro or the Dollar, and did not find sufficient evidence to 
propose one over the other. 
Loureiro et al. (2010), using the OCA theory framework, analysed the official 
euroisation of Cape Verde. This study uses different indicators inspired by the OCA 
theory, to assess how Cape Verde compares against 27 members of the EU. According to 
the authors, Cape Verde shows low inflation and is a highly open country, showing high 
trade integration with EMU. Concerning business cycles correlation, the country also 
appears to be highly correlated with EMU. The authors conclude that Cape Verde will 
reap benefits from euroisation and see no objections in moving forward with this process.  
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Chapter 3. From Theory to Practice 
 
Upon reviewing the literature, one can find many different methodologies being 
employed to assess currency areas in light of the OCA theory. Although some are used 
more often than others, the list includes, for example, descriptive analyses (see, for 
example, Loureiro et al., 2012 and Quah, 2016), the calculation of an “OCA index” 
developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) (other work include, e.g., Barbosa and 
Alves, 2011 and Skorepa, 2013) and the use of Vector Autoregression (VAR) (e.g., 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992 and 1994, and Kempa, 2002). In other studies we can 
find the use of Rolling Correlation (e.g., Stanisic, 2013), Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model 
(e.g., Lehwald, 2013) and the use of an Unobserved Component Model (e.g., Hall and 
Lagoa, 2014). As we can see, the list of methodologies applied to the OCA theory is 
extensive. Moreover, there are numerous studies focusing solely on a few aspects of the 
theory, for example, analysing business cycles synchronisation (e.g., Beckworth 2010) or 
migration (e.g., Chojnicki et al., 2016). However, we will be reviewing the three 
methodologies that appear to be applied more often to the OCA theory as a whole. These 
three are the OCA Index, VAR analysis and the methodology that we will also be using 
in this dissertation - descriptive analysis. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) developed an “OCA index” as a way to 
operationalise the theory and rank how European countries would fair with a common 
currency. In order to do so, the authors used the components that determined nominal 
exchange rate variability. For their sample, the authors used averages of 10-year periods, 
starting in 1973 and ending in 1992. Other studies that have also followed this approach 
are Barbosa and Alves (2011) - with the authors adding a new variable to measure the 
growth of unit labour costs -, Vieira and Vieira (2012) and Skorepa (2013) - with the 
author modifying the original Index to make it sensitive to real income convergence. 
The VAR methodology, applied to the OCA theory framework, is used to analyse 
shocks, for example, shocks to aggregate demand and supply or output (e.g., Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen, 1992 and 1994; Bayoumi and Prasad, 1997; Kempa, 2002); or to 
determine common shocks (national, regional or global) affecting a particular economy 
(e.g. Hsu, 2010; Lee and Azali, 2012). 
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Concerning descriptive analyses, there are examples applied not only to the 
European experience, but also in Asia and Africa. The indicators one may use are vast 
and can be applied not only to OCA criteria, but also key-economic variables, such as the 
evolution of current accounts or debt levels. Regarding Europe, we have, for example, 
the studies of Artis and Zhang (2002), Barbosa and Alves (2011), Jager and Hafner (2013) 
and Pasimeni (2014). The studies of Loureiro et al. (2010 and 2012), Baptista (2015) and 
Quah (2016) are examples of studies focusing on Africa. Regarding Asia, we have, for 
example, the studies of Nguyen (2007), Quah and Crowley (2010, 2012a and 2012b) and 
Quah (2011, 2012, 2013). As mentioned before, there is a large number of indicators used 
in this literature, varying the number of indicators effectively used by each author (for 
example, while Loureiro et al., 2010 and 2012, use 3 indicators, Quah, 2016 uses 9 
indicators). Nonetheless, inflation convergence, business cycles synchronisation and 
trade integration, appear to be among the most often used. 
This dissertation intends to study the Euro Area experience, as a possible OCA, 
since its start and including the recent crises period. By using a descriptive analysis we 
will be able to provide an overall image of what has happened during this sample that 
includes such distinct periods as the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. We will do so by 
analysing the evolution of five indicators that may encompass the main OCA criteria and 
that have also been the main focus of previous studies of this kind: (i) inflation 
differentials; (ii) trade integration; (iii) export diversification; (iv) business cycles 
correlation; and (v) labour mobility. We will analyse the annual evolution of each 
indicator, as well as each period average for all indicators. We will also measure the 
standard deviation of inflation differentials. 
In order to accomplish this analysis, two distinct periods will be compared: the 
first period goes from 1999 to 2007, which can be seen as the pre-crises period; the second 
period covers 2008 to 2016. 9  This second period includes not only the 2008 global 
financial crisis, but also the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, two major shocks that have hit the 
Euro Area. One of the objectives of this dissertation is to establish whether the Euro Area 
is closer or farther from the concept of an OCA. Regarding the period before the 
                                                      
9Except for indicators (ii) and (iii), which due to data restrictions will end in 2015, and except for indicator 
(v), in which there are only 4 distinct years in our sample. 
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introduction of the Euro, literature suggests that the OCA criteria appears to not have 
been fully achieved by member countries (Wagner, 2014; Andrade and Duarte, 2015). 
Regarding the countries under analysis, this dissertation will focus on the 
European Union members. These countries will be grouped in the following way. 
Regarding Euro Area (EA-19), there are two groups: founding members and recent 
members. We consider founding members to be the first countries to form the Euro 
Area10, in 1999, plus Greece that joined in 2001. Recent members encompasses all other 
accessions11. Regarding the remaining EU members12, they will be addressed as Non-EA 
EU28 members. We will now elaborate on each indicator to be analysed. 
(i) Inflation Differentials  
Concerning inflation differentials, there are a significant number of empirical 
studies that use this indicator (e.g., Artis and Zhang, 2002; Nguyen, 2007; Loureiro et al., 
2010 and 2012; Quah and Crowley, 2010, 2012a and 2012b; Quah, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 
2016; Baptista, 2015). We will analyse the behaviour of inflation differentials, 
particularly each period average and standard-deviation. In our case, we will calculate the 
inflation differentials of each country in our sample with the Euro Area 19 (EA-19). EA-
19 has been chosen as the benchmark since it encompasses all of the current members 
and therefore it is able to provide a better view of how it fairs concerning the OCA theory. 
Inflation rates were calculated by the author, on the basis of the annual Harmonised 
Consumer Price Index (HCPI) from the AMECO database13. This indicator is calculated 
as the absolute value of the inflation differential, 
19EAiilifferentiaInflationD   , 
                                                      
10 Founding members of Euro Area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
11 Accession dates: Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), 
Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) 
12 Non-EA EU28 Members: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden and the UK 
13http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/ResultSerie.cfm accessed in April 2017 
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where i is the rate of inflation of country i  and 19EA is the rate of inflation for the whole 
EA-19. With the absolute value we can measure the magnitude of each countries’ 
differentials and evaluate how inflation rates compare to that of the whole Euro Area.  
(ii) Trade Integration 
Regarding trade integration, there are a few studies that analysed this, although 
using different ways to measure integration (e.g., Artis and Zhang, 2002; Nguyen, 2007; 
Loureiro et al., 2010 and 2012; Quah and Crowley, 2010, 2012a and 2012b; Quah, 2011, 
2012, 2013 and 2016; Baptista, 2015). This dissertation will measure trade integration as,  
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where Xsi refers to exports to EA-19 by country i, Msi refers to imports from EA-19 by 
country i and GDPi refer to GDP of country i. The data on imports from and exports to 
the EA-19, were obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development Statistics (UNCTADStat)14. This database was chosen since it provided the 
possibility to select the trading partner, in this case, EA-19. The data on GDP comes from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database15. 
(iii) Export Diversification 
Concerning export diversification, Nguyen (2007) measured export 
diversification using the inverse of the Herfindahl Index, acknowledged as a popular 
indicator of the degree of specialization. Quah (2011, 2012, 2013 and 2016) and Quah 
and Crowley (2010 and 2012a) have also used this indicator to measure export 
diversification. This dissertation will measure export diversification using an index 
available at UNCTADstat16, called the Product Concentration Index. This index also 
                                                      
14 Exports:http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=24739 accessed in 
April 2017 
  Imports:http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=24741 accessed in 
April 2017 
15https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx accessed in April 2017 
16http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=120 accessed in April 2017 
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measures export product diversification, and has a similar interpretation to that of the 
index used by the authors mentioned above. The Product Concentration Index is a 
modified Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, whose values take place between 0 and 1. This 
Index is calculated by the following formula, 
n
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where iH refers to this index for country i, jix is the value of exports from country i and 
product j, Xi is the total exports of country i and n  refers to the total number of products 
of country i. On the one hand, if the index value is closer to 1, then the country’s exports 
are concentrated on a few products. On the other hand, if the value is closer to 0, exports 
are more evenly distributed.  
(iv) Business Cycles Synchronisation 
Regarding business cycles synchronisation, we find a few studies which use a 
correlation coefficient (e.g., Artis and Zhang, 2002; Loureiro et al., 2010 and 2012; Quah 
and Crowley, 2010, 2012a and 2012b; Quah, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2016; Baptista, 2015). 
In order to measure business cycle synchronisation, this dissertation will also use a similar 
correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficient is measured as, 
2
19)(19
2
)(
19)(19)(
19
19
19
).()(
)).((
)().(
),(
),(








EAtEAiti
EAtEAiti
EAi
EAi
EAi
gggg
gggg
gg
ggCov
gg

 , 
where )(tig  is the output gap for country i in year t , )(19 tEAg   is the Euro Area’s output gap 
in year t , 
ig  is the average output gap of country i and 19EAg  is the Euro Area’s average 
output gap. Data on output gaps was obtained from the AMECO database17.  
 
 
                                                      
17http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/ResultSerie.cfmaccessed in April 2017 
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(v) Labour Mobility 
Regarding labour mobility, we are aware that it is a very complex topic and, at 
that, one that has sprouted a lot of empirical studies, as well as different perspectives on 
the subjective. Some studies focused on the regulatory aspects of labour markets (e.g., 
Artis and Zhang, 2002; Alesina et al., 2008; Quah and Crowley, 2010 and 2102b; Quah, 
2011, 2012, 2013 and 2016), while other authors focused on migration (e.g., Gros, 1996; 
Chojnicki et al., 2016). This dissertation will analyse migration in the Euro Area, how it 
has evolved and how it was affected by the crises. Using emigration as proxy for labour 
mobility, this dissertation will gauge the magnitude and the evolution of emigration from 
our sample of countries to EA-19 as a whole. To clarify, we will calculate the ratio 
between the number of emigrants from country i to EA-19 (EmigrantsiEA-19), and each 
countries’ total population (TotalPopi),  
i
iEA
i
TotalPop
Emigrants
lityLabourMobi 19  
We will analyse how emigration has evolved in four distinct years: 2000, 2005, 
2010 and 2015. This is due to data restrictions, since the database, the United Nations 
Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination report18, only supplies a 5-year data frequency. 
This database was chosen because it offers the ability to measure migration to a particular 
destination, and since we are interested in assessing mobility within the Euro Area, the 
ability to know the destination is essential. The data on total population comes from 
UNCTADstat Database19. 
 
  
                                                      
18http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml 
accessed in April 2017 
19http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=97 accessed in April 2017 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Inflation Differentials 
Considering the Euro Area founding members’ results regarding the time pattern 
of inflation differentials (Figure 1, below), we can see that Greece and Ireland stand out 
for their volatile behaviour. In fact, the largest differential for both periods is roughly 
around 3 percentage points (pp.), and occurred in Ireland in both periods (2000 and 2010) 
and in Greece in the second period (2010). Excluding Ireland and Greece, inflation 
differentials for 1999-2007 appear to be no higher than 2 pp., and for 2008-2016 they are 
below 1.5 pp. The majority of the founding members appear to be on a convergence path. 
Figure 1 – Founding Members, Annual Inflation Differentials 
 
Regarding the time pattern of inflation differentials of recent Euro Area members 
(Figure 2) we can observe that the first period was clearly more volatile, especially in the 
cases of Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and even Lithuania. In more recent years, 
especially after 2013, inflation differentials for the recent members have been below 2 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from AMECO Database 
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pp. and appear to be converging, although they seem to remain higher than most founding 
members. 
Figure 2– Recent Members, Annual Inflation Differentials 
 
Regarding the time pattern of inflation differentials for the remaining Non-EA 
EU28 members (Figures 3 and 4), Romania stands out the most with its largest 
differential. In 1999-2007, Romania has shown a large inflation differential against EA-
19, although convergence is also quite evident. In Figure 4, the dispersion among the 
remaining members of EU28 becomes more apparent. Besides Romania, the countries 
which show the most volatile behaviour include Hungary, Bulgaria and to some extent, 
Poland. Figure 4 also illustrates the convergence of the Non-EA EU28 members: after 
2013 these countries were able to have differentials varying between 0 and 2 pp., values 
that are very similar to those of the EA-19 members for the same period. 
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Figure 3 – Non-EA EU28 Members, Annual Inflation Differentials 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Non-EA EU28 Members, Annual Inflation Differentials, truncated scale 
 
Looking at the time pattern of inflation differentials, for all three sets of countries, 
it appears that they were on a convergence path and became more similar in 2008-2016. 
We will now analyse both periods, concerning average differentials and standard-
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deviation. Results for EA-19 members and Non-EA EU28 members are shown in Table 
1, below. 
Table 1 – Inflation Differentials, EA–19 and Non–EA EU28 
 
Concerning the first period, 1999-2007, regarding average inflation differentials, 
we can observe that the EA-19 average for this period is 1.25 pp., with 0.25 pp. being the 
lowest inflation differential (Italy), and 4.42 pp. the highest (Slovakia). It is important to 
note that the lowest differentials pertain to founding members of the EA (Italy, Belgium, 
Eur o Ar ea
Aver age Inflation Differ entials
against EA-19 (pp)
Standar d-Deviation
against EA-19 (pp)
Founding Member s 1999-2007 2008-2016 1999-2007 2008-2016
Austria 0.36 0.50 1.23 0.63
Belgium 0.33 0.58 1.25 0.58
Finland 0.80 0.58 0.92 0.58
France 0.37 0.21 1.22 0.84
Germany 0.55 0.29 1.09 0.78
Ireland 1.29 1.00 0.57 0.28
Italy 0.25 0.26 1.31 0.81
Luxembourg 0.70 0.50 0.99 0.63
The Netherlands 0.90 0.52 0.85 0.62
Portugal 0.85 0.62 0.88 0.55
Spain 1.02 0.47 0.76 0.66
Greece 1.11 1.36 0.70 0.02
Recent Member s 1999-2007 2008-2016 1999-2007 2008-2016
Slovenia 3.37 0.66 0.89 0.52
Cyprus 0.67 0.91 1.01 0.34
Malta 0.59 0.75 1.07 0.46
Slovakia 4.42 0.72 1.64 0.48
Estonia 2.06 1.68 0.03 0.20
Latvia 2.62 2.37 0.37 0.69
Lithuania 1.56 1.73 0.38 0.24
EA-19 Aver age 1.25 0.83 0.90 0.52
Non-EA EU28
Aver age Inflation Differ entials
against EA-19 (pp)
Standar d-Deviation
against EA-19 (pp)
1999-2007 2008-2016 1999-2007 2008-2016
Bulgaria 4.08 2.07 1.40 0.48
Croatia 1.07 0.96 0.73 0.31
Czech Republic 1.05 0.66 0.74 0.52
Denmark 0.49 0.35 1.14 0.74
Hungary 4.69 1.65 1.83 0.18
Poland 2.38 1.10 0.20 0.20
Romania 19.70 2.54 12.45 0.81
Sweden 0.67 0.84 1.01 0.39
UK 0.64 0.95 1.03 0.32
Non-EA EU28 Aver age 3.86 1.24 2.28 0.44
Note: Simple unweighted average; 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of AMECO Database 
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Austria and France), while the highest are observed for recent members (Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). The latter were not then member states of the EA, and, therefore, 
were still in the process of convergence. As shown in Table 1, there are 13 countries that 
show average inflation differentials below the EA-19 average. This evidence of 
dispersion appears to be in line with Lane (2006). After the start of the EMU and in its 
first years there was dispersion of inflation rates among members of the Euro Area (Lane, 
2006). 
Regarding each country’s standard-deviation for 1999-2007, we can observe that 
the EA-19 average for this period is 0.9 pp., the lowest value is 0.3 pp. (Estonia) and the 
highest is 1.64 pp. (Slovakia). It is important to mention, contrary to what we saw 
regarding average differentials, the lowest volatilities belong to recent members (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania). Excluding Slovakia, the highest volatilities belong to a few 
founding members (Italy, Belgium, Austria and France). Slovakia shows, for this period, 
not only the highest average differential but also the highest volatility. As shown in Table 
1, below the EA-19 average standard-deviation there are 9 countries, including 5 
founding members.  
Concerning inflation differentials in 1999-2007, and considering the OCA theory, 
the founding members of EA appear to be closer to an OCA than recent members. This 
is evident, especially when we keep in mind that almost all founding members appear to 
be below the EA-19 average. 
Focusing on the second period, 2008-2016, regarding average inflation 
differentials, we can observe that the EA-19 average for this period is 0.80 pp., the lowest 
average inflation differential is now 0.21 pp. (France) and the highest is 2.37 pp. (Latvia). 
The lowest differentials belong to founding members (France, Italy and Germany), with 
recent members showing the highest differentials (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). As we 
can see in Table 1, there are 14 countries below the whole area average. Concerning 
standard-deviation, for the second period we can observe that the EA-19 average is 0.52 
pp., the lowest value is 0.02 pp. (Greece) and 0.84 pp. is the highest (France). Excluding 
Greece, the lowest volatilities belong to recent members (Estonia and Lithuania). The 
highest volatilities belong to a few founding members (France, Italy and Germany). As 
we can see in Table 1, there are now 8 countries with values below the EA-19 average. 
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Comparing both periods, we can see that both, the EA-19 average differentials 
and volatilities, were reduced by about one third and 40%, respectively. The EA-19 as a 
whole, and concerning this indicator, appears to be more uniform. It is also important to 
highlight the cases of  Slovakia and Slovenia: although showing the highest average 
differentials in the first period, these countries were able to converge to EA-19, showing 
reductions of 84% (Slovakia) and 80% (Slovenia). Despite showing signs of convergence, 
Estonia and Latvia, as well as Lithuania, with a slight divergence, continue to show 
average inflation differentials that are more than double of that of the EA-19 average. In 
turn, this could make us question their respective accessions, at least in light of this 
indicator. The large majority of founding members continue to show inflation 
differentials below the EA-19 average. New members also show a positive evolution, and 
that seems to be consistent with their accession (e.g., Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
Convergence among the Euro Area members, regarding this indicator and 
considering the OCA theory, has had a positive evolution. Andrade and Duarte (2015) 
noted the existence of inflation convergence in the Euro Area, and that also seems to be 
the case in our analysis. 
In conclusion, there are clear differences between the two periods under analysis. 
Despite 2008-2016 being the more turbulent period and having to deal with the effects 
caused by both crises, there are a lot of countries which were able to reduce their inflation 
differentials and improve their convergence with the Euro Area. Not only that, but 2008-
2016 also shows the lowest volatility regarding this indicator, which seems to confirm 
the convergence path of most Euro Area members. The analysis of this indicator allows 
us to conclude that recent crises may have had a positive effect on inflation differentials, 
fostering convergence in the Euro Area. Thus, concerning inflation differentials, the Euro 
Area members appear to be closer to forming an OCA in 2008-2016 than they were in 
1999-2007. 
As regards to the remaining Non-EA EU28 members (Table 1, above), during the 
first period, 1999-2007, Romania stands out with the highest average inflation differential 
of 19.7 pp., while the lowest is 0.49 pp. (Denmark). The Non-EA EU28 average is 3.86 
pp., about three times the EA-19 average. Denmark, the UK and Sweden show the most 
convergence with EA-19 and, along with Croatia and Czech Republic, these 5 countries 
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are also below the EA-19 average for this period. Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary show 
high average inflation differentials, especially when we compare with EA-19. Concerning 
the standard-deviation of each country for 1999-2007, the Non-EA EU28 average is about 
1.5 times higher than EA-19. Romania continues to stand out with 12.45 pp., whereas 
Poland (0.2 pp.), shows the lowest volatility. 
Regarding the OCA theory, and concerning this period, the old members of EU - 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK - and possibly the more recent members Croatia and Czech 
Republic, would be ready to join the EA, in light of this indicator especially when we 
consider that they show comparable averages and volatilities to those of the founding 
members. Accession of these countries to the Euro Area would be acceptable in light of 
the OCA theory. 
Considering now the second period, 2008-2016, we can see that the Non-EA  
EU28 average is 1.24 pp.; the lowest average inflation differential is 0,35 pp. (Denmark) 
and the highest is 2.54 pp. (Romania). As we can see in Table 1 above, 3 countries are 
below the EA-19 average. Regarding each country’s standard-deviation, for 2008-2016, 
the Non-EA EU28 average has also registered a reduction. In fact, this average is lower 
than the EA-19 average for the same period. With 0.18 pp., Hungary exhibits the lowest 
volatility and, with 0.81 pp., Romania shows the highest. 
Similarly to what happened in the Euro Area, in 2008-2016, both average 
differentials (about one third) and volatility (about two thirds) have been reduced in the 
Non-EA EU28. Denmark, Czech Republic and Sweden show the lowest inflation 
differentials and are followed by the UK and Croatia. The highest average inflation 
differential and volatility still belong to Romania. However, we can see a remarkable 
improvement, not only with Romania, but also Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary – these last 
three countries saw their inflation differentials reduced by, at least, half. Considering both 
periods, we can observe that inflation differentials have had a positive evolution, with 
countries reducing both average differentials and standard-deviation. Both groups, EA-
19 and Non-EA EU28, appear to be more similar in 2008-2016, than they were in 1999-
2007.  
Regarding the OCA theory, this indicator appears to justify a possible accession 
of Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden to the Euro Area, with these countries showing 
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average inflation differentials below the EA-19 average and volatility comparable to 
those of the current members of EA-19. The OCA theory could also justify the accession 
of the UK and Croatia. 
 
4.2 Trade Integration 
Considering the evolution of trade integration from 1999 to 2015, there are some 
countries that stand out (Figure 5). Concerning founding members, the continuously high 
trade integration of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg is clear in Figure 5, 
below. The consistently low levels for Greece are also evident. Concerning recent 
members (Figure 6), Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia have had the highest trade with EA-
19, while Cyprus clearly has been the less integrated member. All EA-19 countries have 
seen their values of trade integration reduced in 2009, by comparison to 2008 (Figure 5 
and 6). This may be due to the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis in the Euro Area 
economies.  
Figure 5 – Founding Members, Annual Trade Integration 
       
Concerning Non-EA EU28 members, when we focus on the annual evolution of trade 
integration from 1999 to 2015, the same trend observed for the Euro Area members 
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emerges (Figure 7, below). Trade integration of all countries falls in 2009 and, with the 
exception of Sweden and the UK, it starts falling in 2008. This may be once again 
explained by the 2008 global financial crisis and its effects on the economy and, 
particularly, on trade. Concerning this group of countries, Czech Republic and Hungary 
are the two countries which appear to be more integrated with EA-19, and the UK is 
clearly the less integrated country. Moreover, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
even Poland appear to have witnessed an increase in integration in the second period. 
Figure 6 – Recent Members, Annual Trade Integration 
Figure 7 – Non-EA EU 28 Members, Annual Trade Integration
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We will now analyse both periods, concerning average trade integration. Results 
for EA-19 members and Non-EA EU28 members are shown in Table 2, below. 
Table 2 – Trade integration, EA–19 and Non-EA EU28 Members 
 
Eur o Ar ea Aver age Tr ade Integr ation with EA-19 (% )
Founding Member s 1999-2007 2008-2015
Austria 21.7% 21.5%
Belgium 49.2% 50.4%
Finland 10.7% 9.6%
France 10.6% 10.5%
Germany 12.5% 13.5%
Ireland 16.3% 13.0%
Italy 9.9% 9.8%
Luxembourg 38.1% 30.0%
The Netherlands 27.3% 33.1%
Portugal 17.8% 18.5%
Spain 11.9% 10.4%
Greece 7.0% 7.0%
Recent Member s 1999-2007 2008-2015
Slovenia 29.0% 31.1%
Cyprus 9.2% 10.1%
Malta 23.6% 15.1%
Slovakia 32.1% 30.6%
Estonia 33.3% 32.4%
Latvia 18.8% 24.1%
Lithuania 19.8% 25.4%
EA-19 Aver age 21.0% 20.8%
Non-EA EU28 Aver age Tr ade Integr ation with EA-19 (% )
1999-2007 2008-2015
Bulgaria 21.5% 22.5%
Croatia 17.2% 16.1%
Czech Republic 35.3% 40.1%
Denmark 13.0% 11.8%
Hungary 36.2% 41.2%
Poland 16.0% 19.0%
Romania 18.3% 18.4%
Sweden 13.7% 13.3%
UK 9.3% 9.1%
Non-EA EU28
Aver age
20.1% 21.3%
Note: Simple unweighted average; 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from 
UNCTADstat (exports and imports), IMF World 
Economic Outlook (GDP) 
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Considering the first period, 1999-2007, regarding average trade integration, we 
can observe that the EA-19 average for this period is 21%; being 49,2% (Belgium) the 
highest value, and 7% (Greece) the lowest. We can also see that there are 8 EA countries 
with integration above the EA-19 average. Interestingly, 4 of these are founding members 
and the remaining 4 are recent members.  
Concerning the founding members, Belgium stands out with trade integration that 
is more than double that of the EA-19 average. Luxembourg and The Netherlands also 
stand out for their large values. Luxembourg’s trade integration is about 4/5 higher than 
the EA-19 average and The Netherlands is about 1/3 higher than the EA-19 average. With 
trade integration that is about half or less of the EA-19 average, we have Greece, Finland, 
France and Italy. Spain and Germany also show low trade integration, slightly higher than 
half of the EA-19 average. When we consider the size of the economies, the low values 
of Germany, France, Italy and even Spain may not be that surprising. However, 
considering this indicator in light of the OCA theory, the low integration of Greece and 
Finland is more unsettling. Regarding recent members, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia 
show trade integration about 1/2 higher than the EA-19 average. Cyprus, on the other 
hand, is below the EA-19 average.  
Regarding this indicator, it is clear that there is a large disparity among countries 
for this time period. Greece, followed by Cyprus and Italy - and even France and Finland 
- show trade integration that amounts to roughly half of the EA-19 average. Moreover, it 
is also worth highlighting that some recent members, which did not participate in the EA 
at the time, showed integration that surpassed that of current members and would be able 
to possibly partake in the EA sooner (e.g., comparing Estonia to Greece). Nonetheless, 
the majority of the remaining members show high levels of trade integration with EA-19 
and, in light of the OCA theory and this indicator, may be closer to forming an OCA. 
Regarding the second period, 2008-2015, the EA-19 average is now 20.8%. The 
highest value of trade integration is 50.4% (Belgium) and the lowest is 7% (Greece). Both 
countries continue to stand out, but for different reasons. For this period, we have now 9 
countries with trade integration above the EA-19 average and Portugal is fairly close, 
with 18.5%. Considering the founding members, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg are still the countries that are most integrated with the EA-19. However, 
  
 
44 
Luxembourg, along with Ireland, have seen a reduction in trade integration of around 1/5 
each. Considering recent members, Latvia and Lithuania show the biggest increases in 
trade integration, of more than 1/4 each, while Malta has experience a reduction in trade 
integration of 1/3.  
When we compare the two periods, we come to the conclusion that, regarding this 
indicator, they appear to be very similar. There are still signs of large disparities between 
members. Although there is a positive evolution of trade integration for many countries, 
there are a few that maintain levels well below the EA-19 average. The majority of 
founding members also seem to be consistently below the EA-19 average. Recent 
members, overall, appear to have higher levels of integration than the founding members. 
The seemingly small trade integration showed by some members (e.g. Greece, Finland 
and Italy) may be sufficient to make us question their membership in the EA, in what 
concerns this indicator. Thus, in light of the OCA theory, the Euro Area as a whole 
appears to have maintained a similar performance in both periods, regarding this 
indicator, and we cannot conclude whether it is closer or farther from being an OCA. 
In respect to the Non-EA EU28 members (Table 2, above) and considering the 
first period, 1999-2007, the average trade integration for Non-EA EU28 members is only 
slightly lower than the average of the EA-19, with Hungary (36.2%) and Czech Republic 
(35.3%) being the most integrated and the UK (9.3%) the least integrated. Having in mind 
the values for the EA members during this period, regarding this indicator, all Non-EA 
EU28 members seem to be as adequate as most of them to belong to the EA, in light of 
the OCA theory – especially if we keep in mind the low integration of Greece, Cyprus 
and Italy for this time period. 
Focusing now on the second period, 2008-2015, Hungary (41.2%) and Czech 
Republic (40.1%) continue to show the highest integration with EA-19, while The UK 
has the lowest (9.1%). When we compare both periods, we conclude that Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Bulgaria show trade integration above the EA-19 average for both periods. 
Poland, although being below EA-19’s average, shows a considerable increase, of around 
18,5%. All Non-EA EU28 members are more integrated with the EA than Greece, during 
both periods – this leads us to conclude that, considering this indicator, all Non-EA EU28 
members are more prepared to join the EA than Greece that is an actual member, or, 
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Greek accession and membership in the EA could possibly be questioned. On the basis 
of this indicator, and considering the OCA theory, these results suggest that Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic and Hungary are the countries that seem to be the most prepared to join 
the Euro Area, having successfully increased integration throughout our sample, despite 
the 2008 global crisis.  
 
4.3 Export Diversification 
 
Concerning the annual evolution of each countries Concentration Indices (Figures 
8 and 9) the first observation that stands out is that Malta is the least diversified member 
of EA-19. All other countries seem to be scoring below 0.3, with the exception of Greece 
for 2012, 2013 and 2014 and Cyprus (1999). The Euro Area members, in general, appear 
to be well diversified in terms of exports. 
Regarding the annual evolution of the Product Concentration Indices of Non-EA 
EU28 members, all of these present values below 0.16 for the entire length of the sample, 
1999-2015 (Figure 10, below). The Non-EA EU28 members appear to be highly export-
diversified. 
Figure 8 – Founding Members, Annual Product Concentration Indices
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Figure 9– Recent Members, Annual Product Concentration Indices 
 
 
Figure 10 – Non-EA EU28, Annual Product Concentration Indices 
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Table 3 – Product Concentration Indices, EA– 19 and Non– EA EU28 Members 
 
 
Eur o Ar ea Aver age Pr oduct Concentr ation Index
Founding Member s 1999-2007 2008-2015
Austria 0.07 0.06
Belgium 0.10 0.10
Finland 0.20 0.14
France 0.08 0.09
Germany 0.10 0.10
Ireland 0.22 0.25
Italy 0.05 0.05
Luxembourg 0.13 0.13
The Netherlands 0.11 0.11
Portugal 0.10 0.08
Spain 0.12 0.10
Greece 0.10 0.26
Recent Member s 1999-2007 2008-2015
Slovenia 0.11 0.16
Cyprus 0.23 0.19
Malta 0.45 0.39
Slovakia 0.14 0.17
Estonia 0.15 0.12
Latvia 0.16 0.09
Lithuania 0.16 0.18
EA-19 Aver age 0.15 0.14
Non-EA EU28 Aver age Pr oduct Concentr ation Index
1999-2007 2008-2015
Bulgaria 0.12 0.12
Croatia 0.13 0.10
Czech Republic 0.09 0.11
Denmark 0.08 0.09
Hungary 0.13 0.12
Poland 0.08 0.07
Romania 0.12 0.10
Sweden 0.12 0.09
UK 0.10 0.12
Non-EA EU28 Aver age 0.11 0.10
Note: Simple unweighted average. 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from UNCTADstat 
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Regarding the first period, 1999-2007, it becomes very clear that, overall, the Euro 
Area members have very diversified export structures. We can observe that the EA-19 
average is 0.15, with Italy (0.05), Austria (0.07) and France (0.08) being the more 
diversified and with Malta (0.45) showing less diversification. As shown in Table 3, there 
are 13 countries below the EA-19 average, with Latvia and Lithuania being very close to 
the EA-19 average. Founding members and recent members appear to be very similar, 
with most showing diversified exports. Concerning this period, and regarding the OCA 
theory, the EA-19 countries appear to be rather uniform, with high levels of export 
diversification. Of all the EA-19 countries, Malta is the least diversified, which, in light 
of this indicator, would mean that possibly should not belong to the EA – this in turn is 
consistent with this countries’ position given that, at the time, it was not a member. The 
homogeneity observed among members may also have positive implications regarding 
their positioning as an OCA, considering this indicator. 
Focusing now on the second period, 2008-2015, the EA-19 average is 0.14, with 
Italy (0.05) and Austria (0.06) showing the most diversification of exports and with Malta 
(0.39) showing the least. As shown in Table 3, there are still 13 countries below the EA-
19 average. Founding members and recent member continue to show very little 
differences between both groups. Regarding the founding members of Euro Area, Greece 
and Ireland are the least diversified countries of this group. When we consider both 
periods, they are overall very similar. Greece appears to stand out, with an increase of 
concentration of about 1.5 times. Overall, the majority of countries appear to be quite 
diversified, in terms of exports. In conclusion, in terms of export diversification, Euro 
Area members already exhibited high levels of diversification. However, some countries 
stand out regarding their increased diversification (e.g., Latvia and Finland). Overall, 
regarding this indicator, the Euro Area seems to be closer to an OCA in 2008-2015, even 
if the export diversification of some of its members clearly went in the other direction.  
The Non-EA EU28 members, for the first period in our sample, also appear to 
have very diversified exports (Table 3, above). We can observe that the Non-EA EU28 
average is 0.11, with Denmark (0.08) and Poland (0.08) being the more diversified and 
with Croatia (0.13) and Hungary (0.13) showing higher indices. All Non-EA EU28 
members are more diversified than the average EA-19 members. Therefore, regarding 
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this indicator and the theory of OCA, all Non-EA EU28 members would be more 
prepared to join Euro Area than some of the current members, in this period. 
In what concerns 2008-2015, we can observe that the Non-EA EU28 average is 
0.10, with Poland (0.07), Denmark (0.09) and Sweden (0.09) being the more diversified 
and with Bulgaria (0.12), Hungary (0.12)  and the UK (0.12) showing higher indices.  The 
Non-EA EU28 members are still highly diversified and even more than some of the EA-
19 members. Keeping this in mind, for this time period and considering this indicator, the 
remaining EU28 members would be able to proceed with accession into Euro Area. 
 
4.4 Business Cycles Synchronisation 
 
We will now analyse the average business cycle synchronisation of each country, 
for the two time periods, 1999-2007 and 2008-2016. The results for both EA-19 members 
and Non-EA EU28 members are presented in Table 4, below. 
Regarding the Euro Area members, for 1999-2007, we can observe that the EA-
19 average is 0.62, with 0.12 (Lithuania) being the lowest correlation and 0.94 (Italy) the 
highest. As expected, with the exception of Greece, all the founding members are more 
correlated with EA-19, than recent members. This is possibly due to the fact that recent 
members were still in a process of convergence, since, at the time, they were not members 
of the EA. The majority of the Euro Area founders appear to show high levels of 
correlation with the currency area, for the first period. Therefore, these countries appear 
to be closer to an OCA, than recent members, in 1999-2007. Greece, however, appears to 
show more similarities with the recent members, than with its own group.  
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Table 4 – Business Cycles Correlations, EA and Non– EA EU28 Members 
 
 
Concerning the following period, 2008-2016, the EA-19 average is 0.76, the 
lowest correlation is 0.47 (Ireland and Latvia), and the highest correlation is 0.98 (The 
Netherlands). We can see that, comparing with the first period, the EA-19 average 
business cycle correlation has increased. Greece, although being under the EA-19-
Eur o Ar ea Aver age Business Cycle
Cor r elation with EA-19
Founding Member s 1999-2007 2008-2016
Austria 0.90 0.84
Belgium 0.77 0.96
Finland 0.90 0.93
France 0.83 0.94
Germany 0.93 0.69
Ireland 0.85 0.47
Italy 0.94 0.96
Luxembourg 0.83 0.86
The Netherlands 0.84 0.98
Portugal 0.67 0.72
Spain 0.59 0.74
Greece 0.36 0.49
Recent Member s 1999-2007 2008-2016
Slovenia 0.51 0.93
Cyprus 0.51 0.67
Malta 0.29 0.54
Slovakia 0.39 0.93
Estonia 0.35 0.60
Latvia 0.29 0.47
Lithuania 0.12 0.65
EA-19 Aver age 0.62 0.76
Non-EA EU28 Aver age Business Cycle
Cor r elation with EA-19
1999-2007 2008-2016
Bulgaria 0.09 0.95
Croatia 0.45 0.86
Czech Republic 0.45 0.97
Denmark 0.66 0.94
Hungary 0.01 0.82
Poland 0.66 0.57
Romania -0.09 0.82
Sweden 0.77 0.82
UK 0.50 0.56
Non-EA EU28 Aver age 0.39 0.81
Note: Simple unweighted average 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from AMECO 
Database (output gaps) 
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average, has had a considerable increase in business cycle synchronisation. However, 
Ireland has experienced the opposite, with a drastic reduction. Recent members registered 
the higher increases of business cycles correlation - Lithuania (more than 4 times as 
much), Slovakia (about 1.3 times as much) and even Slovenia (about 5/6) stand out. 
Analysing both periods, we can clearly see that there was an overall tendency for 
increasing business cycles correlation, by comparison with the previous period. In 
conclusion, regarding the correlation of business cycles, the Euro Area as a whole appears 
to be closer to an OCA after the recent crises. This is in line with the “endogeneity 
hypothesis” of Frankel and Rose (1998). Moreover, the effects of the 2008 global 
financial crisis may have had an impact in driving business cycles closer, even if those 
effects may have had negative consequences for economic growth.  
Considering the remaining EU28 members (Table 4, above), for 1999-2007, we 
can observe that the Non-EA EU28 average is 0.39, well below the EA-19 average. 
Sweden appears to be the most correlated of these countries (0.77), while the Romanian 
business cycle is clearly not synchronized with the Euro Area (-0.09). For this period, we 
can see a large disparity among the Non-EA EU28 members. Nonetheless, Sweden, 
Poland and Denmark could be potential candidates for accession, given that they show 
values that are above the EA-19 average business cycle correlation. 
Turning now to the analysis of the second period, the Non-EA EU28 average is 
now 0.81; Czech Republic (0.97), Bulgaria (0.95) and Denmark (0.94) are the most 
synchronised with EA-19, and the UK shows the smallest correlation (0.56). The Non-
EA EU28 average has not only doubled in this period, but it is now slightly higher than 
the EA-19 average for 2008-2016. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria show astonishing 
increases, and are now as synchronised as the most correlated EA members. Therefore, 
in light of this indicator, these last three countries could become members of the EA. 
Considering both periods, the remaining Non-EA EU28 members seem to follow a 
similar trend to the Euro Area members, with some even surpassing the synchronisation 
of current members and, therefore, being possibly more prepared to join the EA rather 
than some of its current members (e.g, comparing Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Denmark, among others, against Ireland, Latvia and Greece). 
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4.5 Labour Mobility 
  
We will now analyse labour mobility, using emigration to EA-19 as proxy. When 
it comes to emigration, Euro Area members show very diverse values among themselves 
along the 4 years analysed. Concerning the founding members (Figure 11, below), 
Portugal and Luxembourg stand out by having the highest rates of emigration to EA-19, 
for the 4 years under our analysis. Of this group, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and 
Spain registered the lowest emigration to EA-19, with rates being consistently lower than 
2%, throughout these years. Regarding the recent members (Figure 12, below), Malta 
stands out with the lowest emigration to EA-19 during these 4 years, with rates always 
lower than 2%. Of this group, Estonia and Lithuania show the highest emigration to EA-
19, although with values considerably lower to those of Portugal and Luxembourg. 
Keeping in mind the OCA theory, we can see that, with some rare and possibly even 
surprisingly exceptions (Greece, Italy, Spain and Cyprus), emigration appear to have seen 
an increase after the beginning of the global financial crisis. This is clearly visible in the 
case of Portugal but also in the Baltic countries, for example. 
Figure 11 – Founding Members Emigration to EA-19 
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Concerning the Non-EA EU28 members (Figure 13, below), Romania clearly 
shows the highest emigration to EA-19, in the most recent years. Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Poland and Bulgaria also seem to show high levels of emigration to EA-19. Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK are clearly the countries with the lowest levels, throughout these 4 
years, with their emigration to EA-19 being consistently below 2%, during the sample 
period. Once again, in light of the OCA theory, and with the exception of Croatia and 
possibly Denmark, there seems to be an increase in emigration after the beginning of the 
global financial crisis. 
Figure 12 – Recent Members Emigration to EA-19 
Figure 13 – Non-EA EU28 Emigration to EA-19
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We will now analyse the averages for our two time periods: 2000-2005 and 2010-
2015, and for both EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, which are presented in Table 5, 
below. 
Table 5 – Emigration to EA– 19, EA and Non– EA EU28 Members
 
Euro Area
Founding Members 2000-2005 2010-2015
Austria 3.04% 3.47%
Belgium 2.75% 3.18%
Finland 0.78% 0.87%
France 1.01% 1.23%
Germany 1.15% 1.52%
Ireland 1.09% 1.21%
Italy 2.14% 1.88%
Luxembourg 7.11% 9.27%
The Netherlands 1.92% 2.46%
Portugal 9.64% 10.05%
Spain 1.46% 1.14%
Greece 3.51% 2.77%
Recent Members 2000-2005 2010-2015
Slovenia 2.73% 3.21%
Cyprus 3.64% 3.23%
Malta 0.93% 1.22%
Slovakia 1.27% 2.03%
Estonia 2.26% 4.81%
Latvia 2.12% 3.90%
Lithuania 2.57% 4.75%
EA-19 Average 2.69% 3.27%
Non-EA EU28
2000-2005 2010-2015
Bulgaria 2.61% 6.33%
Croatia 7.97% 7.61%
Czech Republic 3.36% 6.76%
Denmark 0.95% 0.85%
Hungary 1.77% 2.91%
Poland 3.51% 6.61%
Romania 4.76% 13.10%
Sweden 1.04% 1.21%
UK 1.27% 1.72%
Non-EA EU28 Average 3.03% 5.23%
Average Emigration to EA-19
Average Emigration to EA-19
Note: Simple unweighted average 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from UN 
Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination report 
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Concerning the first period, 2000-2005, we can observe that the EA-19 average is 
2.69%, with 9.64% (Portugal) being the highest emigration rate and 0.78% (Finland) the 
lowest. Portugal and Luxembourg registered the highest levels of emigration, and both 
are also smaller countries. Regarding the founding members of the Euro Area, five are 
above the EA-19 average. Regarding recent members, only two are above that average. 
However, when we exclude Portugal and Luxembourg, recent members appear to be more 
mobile than founding members – there are only two recent members with emigration rates 
below 2% (Malta and Slovakia), whereas there are six founding members below that same 
rate (Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands and Spain). Hence, when we 
regard this period, and consider the OCA theory, recent members seemed to be more 
mobile and therefore more prepared to belong to this currency area. This is interesting, 
especially when we keep in mind that recent members were not part of the EA at the time. 
In regards to the second period, 2010-2015, we can observe that the EA-19 average 
is 3.27%, with emigration to EA-19 ranging from 10.05% (Portugal) to 0.87% (Finland). 
There are three founding members and three recent members above the EA-19 average, 
but Belgium, Slovenia and Cyprus are close to that value. Regarding founding members, 
Luxembourg and The Netherlands saw an increase of around one third. In respect to 
recent members, in this period, Estonia more than doubled its emigration rate and Latvia 
and Lithuania increased slightly over 1.8 times as much. In light of the OCA theory, and 
considering both periods, the majority of Euro Area members, with a few exceptions, 
appear to have increased emigration after the beginning of the crisis, which would mean 
that the adjustment mechanism proposed by Mundell (1961) manifested itself – therefore, 
the Euro Area may be closer to the concept of an OCA, regarding labour mobility.  
Concerning the Non-EA EU28 members, for 2000-2005, their average emigration is 
3.03%, with Croatia (7.97%) showing the highest value and Denmark (0.95%) showing 
the lowest. However, the Non-EA EU28 average is higher than EA-19’s - there are four 
countries above both averages, and Bulgaria comes very close to the EA-19 average. 
Overall, the Non-EA EU28 members appear to show comparable values to those of the 
Euro Area members, concerning this indicator. 
Regarding the second period, 2010-2015, the Non-EA EU38 average is 5.23%, with 
emigration values ranging from 0.85% (Denmark) through 13.10% (Romania). We can 
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observe that the Non-EA EU28 average has increase around 1.75 times, and comparing 
with the EA-19 average, the former is higher. There are five countries above both 
averages. Romania, Bulgaria and Czech Republic have seen their emigration to EA-19 
more than doubled, in this time period. Denmark, Sweden and the UK remain the Non-
EA EU28 countries with the lowest emigration to EA-19. However, overall, these 
countries show levels of emigration comparable to the current EA-19 members and 
therefore, in light of the OCA theory and considering this indicator, all of the Non-EA 
EU28 members could possibly participate in the currency area.  
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Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation we analysed the Euro Area, in light of the OCA theory, and 
considering the turbulent years it has recently experienced. No doubt the recent crises 
have put the Euro Area to the test, exposing some fragilities. We have also analysed the 
preparedness of other EU members to integrate the Euro Area. Overall, the analysis of 5 
indicators, suggested by the OCA theory, appear to point to convergence between 
members. After all that has happened post-2008, including both crises, overall, the Euro 
Area does not seem to be driven further from an OCA, with some indicators actually 
suggesting a tendency for it to become closer to an OCA. Moreover, this seems to be case 
also when one consider the other EU members. 
Concerning the Euro Area members, inflation differentials are found to have had 
a positive evolution, with averages and standard-deviations showing a reduction after 
2008, and with founding and recent members becoming less dispersed. Business cycles 
have also become more synchronised in the second period, especially considering the 
evolution of recent members. Labour mobility has also registered a positive evolution, 
especially after the beginning of the global financial crisis. Regarding trade integration 
and export diversification there do not appear to be considerable differences between the 
two periods. There are, however, large disparities of trade integration between members. 
When it comes to the Euro Area countries that were more affected by the crises, 
in particular the group commonly referred to in the literature as PIIGS, there seems to be 
mixed results regarding our five indicators. Italy appears to be the most integrated country 
with the Euro Area. In fact, Italy is one of the Euro Area members with the lowest average 
inflation differentials and highest business cycles correlation, for example. Portugal also 
appears to be aligned with Euro Area, showing convergence in all indicators. Ireland and 
Spain perform better in some indicators than others. Greece, however, appears to be 
consistently on the lower end of these indicators. For example, Greece is the member 
country which trades less with the Euro Area and its synchronisation with the Euro Area 
is well below average. These results may make us question Greece’s membership, in light 
of the OCA theory: Greece, with these lower scores may have been better off out of the 
Euro Area. 
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Regarding the Non-EA EU28 members, when it comes to inflation differentials, 
these countries show a similar evolution to the Euro Area, and also comparable values. 
Concerning business cycles synchronisation, correlation with the Euro Area has increased 
in the second period and, concerning labour mobility, the period marked by the crisis has 
seen an increase of emigration to the Euro Area. When it comes to trade, Non-EA EU28 
members show similar values to most current EA members and, without exception, all 
show higher integration than Greece for both periods. Finally, these countries also display 
very diversified exports structures, similar to the Euro Area members. Depending on the 
indicator under analysis, some Non-EA EU28 members could be recommended to join 
the currency area – a couple that are often more aligned with the Euro Area are, for 
example, Czech Republic and Croatia. 
Another pertinent result are the similar values of Greece and the UK – with the 
UK even scoring higher in some indicators. In light of the OCA theory, this is a very 
interesting result especially when we consider the opposite positions of both countries, 
with Greece being an actual member of the Euro Area and with the UK preparing to leave 
EU. Therefore, according to the OCA theory, this finding would lead to the conclusion 
that, according to almost all the criteria, Greece is less adequate to be part of the Euro 
Area than the UK might be and, thus, Greece’s membership could be questioned. 
While our analysis does not aim to conclude whether or not the Euro Area 
constitutes an OCA, we can, however, conclude that after being put to the test, having to 
deal with two back-to-back crises, affecting members in different ways, the Euro Area is, 
overall, closer to an OCA.  
We are aware of the limitations of this study. Our analysis does not test the 
potential effects of the crises in the behaviour of the indicators studied, which does not 
allow us to conclude on the role of the crisis for their behaviour. Although suggested by 
the OCA theory, the indicators used in this dissertation assess different aspects that are 
important to the theory. However, some aspects are clearly hard to capture with one single 
indicator – for example, labour mobility. So, our results are dependent on the ability of 
the indicators used to grasp the aspects suggested by the theory. Moreover, by 
concentrating on a given number, we may leave out other relevant aspects: for example, 
given the rise of Euroscepticism, a potentially important element may be political will. 
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The role of political will is an aspect also worth being studied in this context, which would 
contribute towards explaining the behaviour of the Euro Area as an OCA. This type of 
analysis could also be extended to candidates and potential candidates of EU, in order to 
compare them with current Euro Area and EU members, in light of the OCA theory. 
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Annex 
 
Annex 1 – Data Source Table 
Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) 
AMECO Database 
Exports and Imports UNCTADstat 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) IMF World Economic Outlook 
Product Concentration Indices UNCTADstat 
Output Gaps AMECO Database 
Migration Flows UN Migrant Stock by Origin and 
Destination Report 
Total Population UNCTADstat 
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Annex 2 - EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, Annual Inflation Differentials Table 
 
Austria 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,6 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,8 0,1 0,8 1,0 0,8 0,7
Belgium 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,3 1,1 0,3 0,7 0,6 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,6 1,5
Cyprus 0,0 2,7 0,4 0,5 1,9 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,1 0,9 0,8 0,6 1,0 0,7 1,6 1,5
Estonia 1,9 1,7 3,2 1,3 0,7 0,9 1,9 2,2 4,6 7,3 0,1 1,1 2,4 1,7 1,9 0,0 0,0 0,6
Finland 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,3 0,8 2,0 1,4 0,9 0,6 0,6 1,3 0,1 0,6 0,7 0,9 0,8 0,2 0,1
France 0,6 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,1
Germany 0,5 0,8 0,5 0,9 1,1 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,6 0,1 0,5 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,1 0,1
Greece 1,0 0,7 1,2 1,7 1,3 0,8 1,3 1,1 0,8 0,9 1,0 3,1 0,4 1,5 2,2 1,8 1,1 0,2
Ireland 1,3 3,1 1,6 2,4 1,9 0,1 0,0 0,5 0,7 0,2 2,0 3,2 1,5 0,6 0,8 0,1 0,1 0,5
Italy 0,5 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,7 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,2 0,8 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,3
Latvia 0,9 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,8 4,0 4,7 4,4 7,9 11,9 2,9 2,8 1,5 0,2 1,3 0,3 0,2 0,1
Lithuania 0,3 1,1 0,9 1,9 3,2 1,0 0,5 1,6 3,7 7,7 3,8 0,4 1,4 0,7 0,2 0,2 0,7 0,4
Luxembourg 0,2 1,6 0,0 0,2 0,4 1,1 1,6 0,8 0,5 0,7 0,3 1,2 1,0 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,2
Malta 1,1 0,9 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,4 1,5 1,3 1,5 0,4 0,2 0,7 0,4 0,3 1,1 0,7
T he Netherlands 0,9 0,2 2,7 1,6 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,6 1,1 0,7 0,7 0,2 0,3 1,2 0,1 0,2 0,1
Portugal 1,0 0,6 2,0 1,4 1,1 0,3 0,1 0,8 0,3 0,7 1,2 0,2 0,8 0,3 0,9 0,6 0,5 0,4
Slovakia 9,3 10,0 4,7 1,2 6,3 5,3 0,6 2,1 0,3 0,6 0,6 0,9 1,4 1,2 0,1 0,5 0,4 0,7
Slovenia 4,9 6,8 6,1 5,2 3,6 1,5 0,3 0,3 1,6 2,2 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,3 0,6 0,1 0,8 0,4
Spain 1,1 1,3 0,4 1,3 1,0 0,9 1,2 1,4 0,7 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,6 0,7 0,6
Bulgaria 1,4 8,1 4,9 3,5 0,2 4,0 3,8 5,2 5,4 8,6 2,2 1,4 0,7 0,1 1,0 2,0 1,1 1,6
Croat ia 2,6 2,3 1,8 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,8 1,1 0,5 2,5 1,9 0,5 0,5 0,9 1,0 0,2 0,3 0,9
Czech Republic 0,6 1,8 2,1 0,8 2,2 0,4 0,6 0,1 0,8 2,9 0,3 0,4 0,6 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4
Denmark 0,9 0,6 0,1 0,1 0,2 1,2 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,6 0,1 0,1 0,8 0,1 0,2 0,2
Hungary 8,8 7,8 6,7 3,0 2,6 4,6 1,3 1,8 5,8 2,7 3,7 3,1 1,2 3,2 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,2
Poland 6,0 7,9 2,9 0,3 1,4 1,5 0,0 0,9 0,4 0,8 3,7 1,0 1,2 1,2 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,4
Romania 44,6 43,5 32,1 20,2 13,2 9,7 6,9 4,4 2,7 4,6 5,3 4,5 3,1 0,9 1,8 1,0 0,4 1,3
Sweden 0,6 0,9 0,3 0,3 0,2 1,2 1,4 0,7 0,5 0,0 1,6 0,3
Eu r o Ar e a 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
O th e r  EU28 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1,4 1,6 0,9 0,2 0,7 0,9
UK 0,2 1,4 1,2 1,0 0,8 0,8 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,3 1,9 1,7 1,7 0,3 1,2 1,0 0,0 0,4
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from AMECO Database 
  
 
 
Annex 3 - EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, Annual Trade Integration Table 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from UNCTADstat (exports and imports), IMF World Economic Outlook (GDP) 
Austria 18,53% 20,36% 21,04% 20,68% 21,04% 22,73% 22,78% 24,12% 23,77% 23,31% 19,54% 21,68% 22,89% 21,60% 21,35% 20,81% 20,60%
Belgium 40,73% 46,00% 47,69% 48,80% 48,05% 50,03% 52,20% 54,23% 54,75% 55,35% 46,10% 49,14% 52,07% 51,07% 54,40% 48,58% 46,14%
Cyprus 7,87% 8,38% 8,54% 8,47% 7,71% 9,80% 10,83% 10,52% 11,06% 11,37% 9,90% 10,81% 10,17% 9,57% 9,05% 9,85% 9,90%
Estonia 30,36% 38,25% 34,34% 32,01% 32,58% 31,63% 34,92% 33,74% 31,70% 31,41% 26,85% 30,34% 34,47% 35,61% 35,53% 33,41% 31,54%
Finland 10,21% 11,48% 10,78% 10,03% 10,25% 10,19% 10,53% 11,49% 11,67% 11,29% 8,62% 9,33% 10,19% 8,95% 9,13% 9,39% 9,59%
France 10,08% 11,04% 10,60% 10,37% 10,23% 10,44% 10,67% 11,00% 11,05% 10,94% 9,22% 10,31% 11,03% 10,95% 10,60% 10,38% 10,26%
Germany 10,34% 11,92% 11,54% 11,24% 11,89% 12,72% 13,24% 14,31% 14,88% 14,89% 12,63% 13,65% 14,17% 13,58% 13,24% 13,06% 13,06%
Greece 7,73% 7,20% 6,52% 5,95% 6,87% 6,90% 6,92% 7,20% 7,35% 7,84% 6,55% 6,35% 6,74% 6,64% 6,87% 7,19% 7,49%
Ireland 19,30% 19,54% 18,57% 17,43% 15,23% 14,97% 14,97% 13,78% 13,31% 13,22% 13,51% 13,76% 13,53% 13,67% 12,32% 11,68% 11,93%
Italy 9,46% 10,18% 10,08% 9,62% 9,40% 9,60% 9,66% 10,25% 10,63% 10,11% 9,68% 10,21% 10,00% 9,87% 9,96% 10,23%
Latvia 15,47% 16,08% 17,03% 17,59% 18,07% 19,79% 21,42% 22,32% 21,09% 19,47% 22,69% 26,59% 27,84% 27,40% 26,20% 25,19%
Lithuania 16,86% 16,44% 17,68% 18,42% 18,21% 21,43% 21,78% 23,47% 23,57% 22,31% 23,44% 27,23% 28,42% 27,89% 27,09% 27,29%
Luxembourg 33,02% 34,16% 39,05% 36,05% 39,38% 40,97% 41,05% 41,60% 37,46% 38,82% 31,81% 28,76% 29,65% 27,27% 24,13% 25,44%
Malta 28,10% 29,05% 23,36% 23,32% 22,25% 22,13% 21,33% 22,43% 20,50% 17,93% 16,33% 17,05% 17,74% 13,98% 11,75% 11,92%
The Netherlands 25,60% 26,08% 25,61% 24,75% 24,66%
Eur o Ar ea 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Other  EU28 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
27,56% 29,34% 30,97% 31,49% 32,51% 31,91% 34,49% 35,41% 34,70% 34,03% 33,87%
Portugal 17,37% 18,17% 17,81% 17,03% 16,66% 17,12% 17,91% 18,98% 19,17% 19,18% 17,89% 17,73% 17,64% 19,22% 19,76% 20,08%
Slovakia 26,93% 30,59% 33,16% 33,02% 35,32% 33,34% 31,10% 33,05% 32,82% 31,45% 28,19% 31,07% 32,20% 31,78% 32,09% 33,30%
Slovenia 26,21% 28,62% 28,44% 27,16% 26,66% 28,36% 30,06% 32,39% 32,83% 31,39% 29,14% 32,23% 32,42% 32,69% 32,44% 32,81%
Spain 12,13% 12,69% 12,51% 11,92% 11,64% 11,73% 11,28% 11,28% 11,58% 10,66% 9,63% 10,53% 10,27% 10,68% 11,23% 11,56%
Bulgaria 16,42% 19,35% 21,48% 21,00% 21,92% 22,72% 22,82% 24,47% 23,28% 22,07% 16,66% 19,63% 23,38% 23,67% 24,86% 25,12% 24,96%
Croatia 15,93% 17,36% 18,29% 17,58% 18,08% 17,33% 16,58% 17,23% 16,63% 16,56% 13,03% 13,55% 14,75% 14,89% 16,97% 18,71% 20,33%
Czech Republic 29,86% 33,28% 34,48% 36,50% 33,37% 36,57% 36,47% 38,13% 38,94% 36,86% 32,19% 36,58% 40,42% 41,29% 41,80% 45,59% 45,73%
Denmark 12,42% 12,71% 13,29% 13,63% 12,84% 12,75% 12,66% 13,30% 13,42% 13,31% 10,85% 11,08% 11,86% 11,60% 11,97% 12,02% 11,94%
Hungary 36,32% 40,53% 37,73% 32,40% 32,22% 35,35% 34,09% 38,41% 39,10% 38,75% 35,06% 38,48% 41,58% 42,91% 42,62% 44,40% 45,50%
Poland 13,26% 13,66% 13,25% 14,11% 16,42% 18,46% 17,58% 18,59% 19,08% 19,05% 17,59% 17,91% 19,28% 18,21% 19,31% 19,92% 20,79%
Romania 15,21% 17,21% 19,20% 19,89% 19,98% 20,44% 17,72% 17,50% 17,38% 16,43% 15,64% 17,55% 19,47% 19,29% 19,06% 19,57% 19,98%
Sweden 12,19% 14,18% 13,30% 13,01% 13,00% 13,54% 14,10% 14,87% 15,18% 15,35% 12,88% 13,47% 14,03% 13,19% 12,50% 12,60% 12,59%
UK 8,83% 9,75% 9,66% 9,51% 9,12% 8,97% 8,87% 10,08% 8,88% 9,27% 8,51% 9,35% 9,91% 9,09% 9,31% 8,94% 8,34%
8,47%
17,16%
19,22%
33,91%
14,45%
27,63%
16,36%
24,79%
25,66%
8,80%
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Annex 4 - EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, Annual Diversification Indices Table 
 
 
Austria 0,07 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 
Belgium 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,10 
Cyprus 0,32 0,29 0,26 0,19 0,19 0,17 0,24 0,20 0,19 0,21 0,18 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,21 
Estonia 0,12 0,22 0,18 0,12 0,12 0,14 0,14 0,16 0,11 0,10 0,13 0,12 0,14 0,14 0,11 0,12 0,12 
Finland 0,22 0,24 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,19 0,19 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,14 
France 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,11 
Germany 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,11 
Greece 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,18 0,16 0,21 0,26 0,34 0,35 0,34 0,25 
Ireland 0,20 0,23 0,23 0,24 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,23 0,23 0,25 0,26 0,26 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,24 
Italy 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 
Latvia 0,21 0,21 0,18 0,17 0,18 0,14 0,12 0,11 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,09 
Lithuania 0,11 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,20 0,21 0,19 0,11 0,20 0,17 0,19 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,14 0,13 
Luxembourg 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,10 
Malta 0,46 0,53 0,45 0,45 0,46 0,48 0,41 0,41 0,39 0,35 0,37 0,43 0,43 0,44 0,42 0,38 0,31 
The Netherlands 0,07 0,14 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,08 
Portugal 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,09 0,16 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,08 
Slovakia 0,13 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,18 0,14 0,12 0,15 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,19 
Slovenia 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,11 0,14 0,15 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,17 
Spain 0,12 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 
Bulgaria 0,10 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,12 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,11 0,12 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,11 0,09 
Croatia 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,09 0,13 0,12 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,07 
Czech Republic 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,11 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11
Euro Area 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Other EU28 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 0,11 0,11 0,12 
Denmark 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 
Hungary 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,13 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,12 
Poland 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,07 
Romania 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,10 
Sweden 0,15 0,15 0,12 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 
UK 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,12 0,10 0,11 0,13 0,11 0,13 0,12 0,15 0,11 0,11 
Source: Product Concentration Indices available at UNCTADstat 71 
  
 
 
Annex 5 - EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, Annual Output Gaps Table 
 
Austria 0,99 1,70 0,64 0,12 -1,23 -0,67 -0,75 0,49 2,21 2,06 -2,53 -1,53 0,31 0,14 -0,65 -0,84 -0,89 -0,79 
Belgium 0,80 1,93 0,40 0,11 -0,97 0,66 0,80 1,43 2,90 1,90 -1,61 -0,23 0,16 -0,73 -1,61 -0,92 -0,55 -0,59 
Cyprus -0,75 1,38 1,67 1,52 0,76 2,06 2,73 3,68 4,93 5,20 1,04 0,52 -0,29 -3,03 -7,07 -6,28 -3,29 -0,82 
Estonia -6,25 -0,88 0,78 1,52 2,88 3,22 6,37 10,96 14,35 5,70 -9,02 -6,58 -0,79 1,83 1,31 1,95 1,02 0,29 
Finland 1,72 3,00 1,53 -0,20 -1,31 -0,32 -0,16 1,51 4,47 3,67 -5,11 -2,45 -0,13 -1,59 -2,28 -2,86 -2,74 -1,83 
France 0,55 2,29 2,32 1,70 0,80 1,77 1,60 2,29 3,00 1,68 -2,21 -1,32 -0,31 -1,06 -1,37 -1,69 -1,40 -1,28 
Germany 0,17 1,47 1,64 0,29 -1,65 -1,72 -2,24 -0,03 1,81 1,63 -4,85 -2,05 0,74 0,40 -0,53 -0,35 -0,16 -0,15 
Greece 1,37 1,21 1,32 1,31 2,48 3,63 1,68 4,87 6,30 5,12 0,93 -3,32 -10,01 -14,10 -14,54 -12,39 -11,06 -9,80 
Ireland 2,40 3,86 2,40 1,32 -0,53 0,97 2,05 3,87 4,78 -0,48 -4,30 -1,89 -1,97 -3,81 -4,41 0,36 1,62 1,82 
Italy 0,05 1,95 2,12 1,08 0,16 0,49 0,64 1,82 2,44 1,18 -3,97 -1,96 -1,33 -2,88 -4,18 -3,81 -2,85 -1,67 
Latvia -0,83 -1,23 -1,29 -0,40 1,47 2,08 4,46 8,43 10,57 2,60 -11,21 -12,21 -5,44 -1,93 -0,16 0,46 1,07 1,62 
Lithuania -2,64 -4,41 -3,73 -3,21 0,88 1,62 3,62 4,93 8,94 6,12 -10,41 -8,93 -4,24 -1,84 -0,33 1,02 0,61 0,82 
Luxembourg 2,80 5,89 3,52 3,11 0,67 0,19 -0,62 0,85 5,43 0,87 -5,51 -2,72 -2,66 -5,73 -4,68 -2,62 -2,06 -0,97 
Malta 0,09 2,39 -0,18 1,19 1,35 -0,47 0,62 0,07 1,35 2,26 -2,10 -1,32 -2,15 -2,65 -1,94 1,58 2,61 1,62 
The Netherlands 1,73 2,61 1,63 -0,69 -2,38 -2,10 -1,57 0,16 2,10 2,07 -2,77 -2,08 -1,23 -2,76 -3,25 -2,52 -1,62 -0,76 
Portugal 2,62 3,16 2,28 0,95 -1,39 -0,86 -1,01 -0,32 1,40 1,01 -1,90 -0,06 -1,39 -4,20 -4,37 -3,15 -1,63 -0,62 
Slovakia -1,07 -3,10 -3,67 -3,26 -2,03 -1,24 0,06 2,54 7,13 7,27 -1,99 -0,48 -1,17 -2,10 -2,81 -2,27 -1,25 -0,35 
Slovenia -0,18 0,18 -0,20 0,58 0,26 1,02 1,63 3,57 6,77 6,51 -3,23 -2,61 -2,18 -4,72 -5,62 -3,28 -1,80 -0,39 
Spain 1,15 3,10 3,66 3,13 2,58 2,29 2,39 3,04 3,04 1,32 -3,22 -4,26 -5,62 -7,84 -8,73 -7,28 -4,50 -1,79 
Bulgaria -4,4 -2,8 -2,5 -0,2 0,25 0,48 0,851 1,52 3,27 4,036 -1,89 -1,08 0,2561 -0,399 -0,74 -1,53 -0,77 -0,25
Croatia NA NA -2,1 -1,2 -0,2 0,539 1,492 3,41 6,08 6,22 -1,31 -1,76 -1,493 -3,029 -3,73 -4,36 -3,05 -1,28
Czech Republic -2,4 -0,2 0,64 -0,2 0,05 0,789 2,429 4,75 5,64 4,396 -2,1 -1,25 -0,377 -1,726 -3,06 -2,12 -0,02 0,217
Denmark 1,54 3,07 2,11 1,1 0,27 1,732 2,8 5,08 4,39 2,307 -3,6 -2,64 -2,146 -2,728 -2,63 -1,9 -1,46 -1,41
Hungary -1,3 -0,6 -0,4 0,42 0,73 2,064 3,281 4,52 2,91 2,478 -4,43 -3,7 -2,124 -3,882 -2,89 -0,89 0,121 0,212
Poland
Euro Area 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Other EU28 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1,18 0,72 -2,4 -4,2 -4,3 -2,75 -2,53 -0 2,83 2,746 1,55 1,236 2,073 0,185 -1,35 -1,08 -0,3 -0,29
Romania -5,4 -5,4 -2,5 0,02 1,67 5,052 4,017 6,15 5,79 7,451 -1,96 -3,96 -3,957 -5,037 -3,31 -2,41 -1,33 -0,08
Sweden 0,52 1,89 0,21 -0,9 -1,4 0,067 0,343 2,42 3,43 0,903 -5,48 -1,35 -0,243 -1,981 -2,47 -1,96 -0,4 0,2
UK 0,58 1,06 0,72 0,19 0,87 0,812 1,314 1,66 2,35 0,29 -4,75 -3,79 -3,242 -2,911 -2,1 -0,44 0,218 0,473
Source: Output Gaps available at AMECO Database 
72 
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Annex 6 - EA-19 and Non-EA EU28 members, Emigration to EA-19 Table 
 
 
 
 
 
Euro Area 2000 2005 2010 2015
Other EU28 2000 2005 2010 2015
Austria 2,82% 3,25% 3,25% 3,68%
Belgium 2,62% 2,88% 3,11% 3,25%
Cyprus 3,71% 3,57% 3,31% 3,16%
Estonia 1,76% 2,77% 3,78% 5,85%
Finland 0,76% 0,80% 0,85% 0,89%
France 0,96% 1,06% 1,21% 1,26%
Germany 1,03% 1,28% 1,49% 1,54%
Greece 3,83% 3,19% 2,65% 2,88%
Ireland 1,05% 1,13% 1,17% 1,25%
Italy 2,36% 1,91% 1,81% 1,94%
Latvia 1,62% 2,62% 3,65% 4,15%
Lithuania 1,91% 3,24% 4,52% 4,97%
Luxembourg 5,78% 8,43% 9,52% 9,02%
Malta 0,91% 0,95% 1,18% 1,27%
The Netherlands 1,81% 2,04% 2,37% 2,55%
Portugal 10,89% 8,38% 9,54% 10,56%
Slovakia 1,05% 1,49% 1,95% 2,11%
Slovenia 2,59% 2,87% 3,10% 3,33%
Spain 1,70% 1,22% 1,09% 1,18%
Bulgaria 1,45% 3,76% 6,13% 6,53%
Croatia 8,07% 7,86% 7,79% 7,43%
Czech Republic 2,25% 4,47% 6,57% 6,96%
Denmark 0,92% 0,98% 1,06% 0,64%
Hungary 1,48% 2,06% 2,76% 3,06%
Poland 2,60% 4,42% 6,42% 6,79%
Romania 2,56% 6,96% 12,83% 13,38%
Sweden 1,00% 1,08% 1,17% 1,26%
UK 1,08% 1,46% 1,73% 1,72%
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from UN Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination 
report 
